Volume 72
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 72,
1967-1968
10-1-1967

Off-Record Risks for Bona Fide Purchasers of Interests in Real
Property
Ralph T. Straw Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Ralph T. Straw Jr., Off-Record Risks for Bona Fide Purchasers of Interests in Real Property, 72 DICK. L. REV.
35 (1967).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol72/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

OFF-RECORD RISKS FOR BONA FIDE PURCHASERS
OF INTERESTS IN REAL PROPERTY
By RALPH L. STRAW, JR.*

I.

II.

Introduction
Forgeriesand Frauds
A. Forged Instruments
B. FraudulentReleases
C. Defraudingof a Grantor
Incapacity of a Grantor
A. Mental Incapacity of a Grantor
B. Infant Grantor
C. Legal Incapacity

II.

Lack of an Essential Formality in the Execution of an
Instrument
A. Lack of Delivery
B. Lack of Acknowledgment

IV.

Mechanics' Liens

V.

VI.

UnrecordedFamily Rights
A. Dower
B. Rights of Pretermittedor After-Born Children
C. Community Property Rights
PriorAdverse Possessionand Undisclosed Easements
A. PriorAdverse Possession
B. Undisclosed PrescriptiveEasements
C. Undisclosed Implied Easements

VII. Failure to Inquire with respect to Possession Not on its
Face Inconsistent with Purchaser'sRights
Tolled LimitationsPeriods
IX. PriorHolder in Chain of Title Senior in Record but Junior
in Time of Actual Notice
X. Rights of Prior Transferees under Recording Acts with
Grace Periodsfor Filing
XI. Void Judgments and Court Orders

VIII.

XII. Subsequently Discovered Will
* Member of the New Jersey Bar. B.A., 1964, Yale College; LL.B.,
1967, Yale University. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance
and advice of Professor Quintin Johnstone of the Yale Law School.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

XIV.
XV.

Foreclosure Sale Stayed under Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act
Instrument Given as Security for Usurious Loan
Recording Errors

XVI.

Estoppel by Deed

XIII.

XVII.
XVIII.

Destructionof Records
Conveyances Void Because of Section 70 of the Bankruptcy
Act
Summary and Conclusion
Appendices
INTRODUCTION

This article will examine the extent of off-record risks for bona
fide purchasers of interests in real property. As used herein, offrecord risks are those circumstances which may operate to divest
a bona fide purchaser of part or all of his interest but which would
not be disclosed by the public records or a prima facie examination
of the premises. The disclosure afforded by public land records
is limited to matters within the bona fide purchaser's chain of
title.' Bona fide purchasers are purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice of the circumstances which operate as offrecord risks; interests in real property include fee simple interests, security interests, easements, and leases.
As the definition of off-record risks indicates, matters of public record which might be outside the scope of a normal title search
will not for the most part be considered off-record risks. Thus,
eminent domain proceedings, lis pendens, and divorce decrees affecting title to realty, which in some jurisdictions may not appear
in the public records usually inspected by title examiners and
abstracters, are not off-record risks. Although such matters may
be risks to the bona fide purchaser because not normally investigated in determining good title, and although title insurance companies insure against them, they are not truly off-record, for they
can be uncovered without excessive effort or cost in judicial or
other governmental records open to public examination.
An exception is the risk posed in certain circumstances by
the 'federal 'bankruptcy law. It is considered in this article as
an off-record risk because, although the bankruptcy petition is of
record, it is of record in a jurisdiction other than that in which the
subject property is located. Therefore, it could only be discovered
through an examination of records which are normally irrelevant to the title examiner. Furthermore, only a highly impractical and prohibitively expensive search of the bankruptcy records
of every federal district court in the country would eliminate this
risk.
1. See 6 R. POWELL, THE

LAW OF REAL PROPERry 778-79 (1965).
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Other off-record risks, such as those arising from an instrument
senior in date but junior in record or from the doctrine of estoppel
by deed, would be similarly disclosed by an impractical search;
that is, one including examination of records outside the chain of
title. Likewise, a fraudulent release of a mortgage could be ascertained by the bona fide purchaser if after recording his interest
he made periodic checks to see that it was still properly recorded.
Off-record risks such as possession not prima facie inconsistent
with the purchaser's interests might be revealed by a thorough
survey of the premises. Still others, such as incapacity to convey and defrauding of a grantor, might be uncovered by investigation into the personal circumstances of grantors in the bona fide
purchaser's chain. On the other hand, off-record risks such as
prior adverse possession and those arising from grace periods for
filing are almost undiscoverable until suit against the purchaser is
filed. In any event, the burden of uncovering any off-record risk
is normally so great that the bona fide purchaser will seek other
means of protection. These means include title insurance, title
warranties, and, in those few states where it is possible, registration under a Torrens act.
Title insurance, of course, is the predominant method in the
United States of guarding against off-record risks; hence off-record risks for bona fide purchasers are especially important to title
insurance companies. Since title insurance policies will usually
except from coverage record defects in title, off-record risks are -a
2
major source of potential liability for title insurance companies.
In addition, vendors *who by covenant warrant good title should
be aware of the extent of off-record risks, if only to exclude them
from the warranty. The conscientious title examiner certifying a
title for his client also ought to be cognizant of off-record risks
extant in his jurisdiction, even though he will not normally be
responsible for losses resulting therefrom.3
It is in the latter field of title examination and certification
that off-record risks assume their greatest importance for the practitioner. As the volume of land sales rises with our expanding
population and with that population's ever increasing mobility, the
threat of off-record risks will increase correspondingly. The practitioner unaware of the nature and. scope of such risks and of
judicial exposition on the subject .will be significantly disadvantaged in handling his client's real property transactions and capable
of doing the client a great deal of harm. 'Nor is the problem of
off-record risks a matter of concern to the property specialist
alone:
It is commonly believed that real property. law and the
appraisal of titles are essentially within the province of the
property or title specialist. In one sense this is true. But
2. See Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66 'YALE L.J. 492, 494-96 (1957).
3. See 1 T. PATTON, TITLES 198-201 (2d ed. 1957).
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it is also true that a title practice cuts across the lines of
many branches of law which lie outside the particular
field of so-called "property law." Such other branches of
law include the law of wills and administration, including
guardianship, the law of persons, corporations, evidence,
procedure and constitutional law not to4 mention certain
aspects of trusts, accounting and taxation.
Thus, counsel for trusts, estates, or corporations involved in real
estate transfers will also be disadvantaged by lack of knowledge
of the extent and bases of off-record risks. On the other hand, an
elementary understanding of off-record risks will in many cases
lead to resolution, or at least avoidance, of the problems they pose.
It is hoped, therefore, that this article will serve a practical
purpose in an area which, despite its importance in terms of potential money, time and energy saved, seems to have been generally neglected in the literature. Only a few articles have attempted to deal with off-record risks and most of them are of pre1930 vintage. 5 Moreover, those articles are generally unsatisfactory. Their lists of off-record risks are incomplete and there is
little consideration of actual cases involving defeasance of bona
fide purchasers' interests by off-record claims.
It should be realized, however, that off-record risks are an
anomaly in American law. Courts in this country have generally
protected the bona fide purchaser whose interest in real property
is threatened by the off-record rights of another." There appear to
be two basic reasons for this protection. When applicable to the
facts of the case, the first reason is often the salutary equitable
doctrine that as between two innocent parties, he who placed the
means in the hands of a third party to commit a wrong (that is,
the holder of the off-record interest) must bear the loss.7 The
second and more general reason is concern for stability of land
titles and the integrity of land records.8 As shall be seen, cases in
which the off-record interest holder prevailed over the bona fide
4. Preface to P. BAYSE, CLEARING LAND TITLES at v (1953).
5. See Rood, Registration of Land Titles, 12 MICH. L. REV. 379, 389-92
(1914); Haymond, Title Insurance Risks of Which the Public Records Give
No Notice, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 422 (1928); cf. Webster, The Quest for Clear
Land Titles, 44 N.C. L. REv. 89, 90-98 (1965).
6. See, e.g., Marlenee v. Brown, 21 Cal. 2d 668, 134 P.2d 770 (1943);
Burch v. Nicholson, 157 Iowa 502, 137 N.W. 1066 (1912); Mid-Kansas Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Binter, 197 Kan. 106, 415 P.2d 278 (1966); Colgin v.
Coursege, 106 La. 684, 31 So. 144 (1902); Brown v. Khoury, 346 Mich. 97,
77 N.W.2d 336 (1956); Phillips v. Buchanan Lumber Co., 151 N.C. 519, 66
S.E. 603 (1909); Dixon v. Kaufman, 79 N.D. 633, 58 N.W.2d 797 (1953);
Strong v. Efficiency Apart. Corp., 159 Tenn. 337, 17 S.W.2d 1 (1929); Pure
Oil Co. v. Swindall, 58 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. Ct. App. 1933).
7. See, e.g., Mid-Kansas Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Binter, 197 Kan.
106, 415 P.2d 278 (1966).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Krause, 92 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. La. 1950);
Floyd County Bd. of Educ. v. Johnson, 260 S.W.2d 217 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953).
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purchaser are usually distinguished by the court's ignorance of or
disregard for these principles.
Generally, however, this article will not attempt to deal with
the overwhelming weight of authority holding that bona fide purchasers are to be protected against off-record risks. Also, an offrecord risk that will defeat a bona fide purchaser's interest in one
jurisdiction will not do so in all jurisdictions. Thus, the concern
herein will be with possibilities rather than probabilities. A broad
outline of the off-record risks which have manifested themselves
in various American jurisdictions and an analysis of the justifications offered for them by the courts is contemplated.
I.

FORGERIES AND FRAUDS

By far the greatest number of cases in which a bona fide purchaser's interest in real property has been defeated by an offrecord risk are those involving forgeries and frauds in the purchaser's chain of title: (1) a forged instrument in the purchaser's
chain of title; (2) a fraudulent release of a mortgage or other
security interest in the purchaser's chain of title; (3) defrauding
of a grantor in the purchaser's chain of title, that is, a prior holder
in the purchaser's chain has been induced by deceit, duress, or
overreaching to part with his interest. The courts usually group
these three off-record risks under the general heading of forgeries,
saying that when an instrument has been procured by fraudulent
misrepresentation or the like, its execution amounts in law to a
forgeryY Likewise, such policy considerations as the courts have
articulated in these cases are substantially identical. It is submitted, however, that the facts of these three groups of cases are
sufficiently different to call into play different policy considerations and that, therefore, they should be distinguished.
There are primarily two policy reasons which the courts have
given for their decisions in these cases. The first is protection of
the rights of the innocent victim of the fraud or forgery. In the
fraud cases especially, an integral component of this policy is
protection of the rights of widows, orphans and other minors,
elderly people and illiterates. The second policy ground is the
prevention of forgery or fraud. Hopefully, it will be demonstrated that these two considerations are not very convincing today, however persuasive they may have been when first articulated.
Where it is held that the forgery or fraud renders nugatory
an essential formal element in the execution of an instrument, such
as delivery or acknowledgment by a necessary party, the policies
underlying those requirements are called into play. Thus, in the
fraudulent delivery cases lack of intent to convey on the part of
the original grantor supports the decision against the bona fide
purchaser-a fairly persuasive result. On the other hand, in the
9.

See Prather v. LaRue, 200 Okla. 151, 191 P.2d 214 (1948).
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forged acknowledgment cases, the forged acknowledgment usually
being that of a spouse, the underlying rationale is often nothing
more than an anachronistic attempt to preserve the homestead interest at the expense of bona fide purchasers via a legal technicality.
A. Forged Instruments
Typically in those cases in which the rights of a bona fide
purchaser were defeated by those of the victim of a forged instrument, the one committing the forgery was an individual having
a special relationship with the victim and who thereby gained
T0
the opportunity to perpetrate the forgery. Thus, Prater v. Prater
was a suit by a husband against his former wife to cancel certain
deeds to jointly held property, one of which had been forged by the
wife to make her appear as sole owner. In reversing a lower
court decision dismissing the plaintiff's suit, and holding that
even as to the subsequent bona fide purchasers without notice the
conveyance under the forged deed operated to pass only a onehalf interest in the subject property, the Mississippi Supreme
Court said:
An altered instrument does not operate to pass title, and
when Mrs. Stribling [Mrs. Prater's grantee] purchased on
the faith of the public records she does not occupy the position of an innocent purchaser for value as to the interest of
Neal Prater. . . . This is true for two reasons; one reason
is that the title as to his one-half interest has never passed
out of Neal Prater by instrument of writing required by
the Statute of Frauds, and secondly, a purchaser under a
forgery is not exalted by law into the preferred position of
innocent purchaser and a thief can give no title. Consequently Mrs. Stribling was vested with an undivided onehalf interest in the property by the deed from Mrs. Prater. 1
It is submitted that the question whether title did pass out of
Neal Prater should have been decided not by a mechanical application of the Statute of Frauds, but by a comparison of Mr. Prater's
equities as against those of subsequent purchasers. Whether Mrs.
Stribling and her successors in title were innocent purchasers
should not have turned on the moral character of their grantor.
As to Mrs. Stribling, it could be said that one who records his
deed, as she did, on the same day as his grantor should be on
notice of possible chicanery. As between Neal Prater and the
other bona fide purchasers, however, it is suggested that one who
does not record his deed and then leaves his estranged wife in
10. 208 Miss. 59, 43 So. 2d 582 (1949).
11' Id. at 67, 43 So. 2d at 584. In a subsequent proceeding, Prater V.
Prater, 208 Miss. 59, 44 So. 2d 538 (1950), Mrs. Stribling was given a lien
on Prater's interest for one-half the amount. pf. mortgage payments made
by her on a mortgage which had been assumed by, Mr. and Mrs. Prater.
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possession of jointly held property
deserves whatever the wiles of
12
alienated womanhood allot him.
Vanhoose v. Fairchild13 was an action to reform or cancel certain deeds. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the reformation by the lower court of a deed forged by the son and brother of
the plaintiffs and its cancellation of the deed to defendant George
Vanhoose. Regarding the latter's contention that he was an innocent purchaser, the court said:
[I]t is not material whether he knew or was ignorant of
the unauthorized alteration by Frank Fairchild of the deed
from C. B. Vanhoose to Abner Fairchild.
Where no title, legal or equitable, passed by a conveyance to the purchaser, for the reason that title was in
another person than the vendor, the fact that
14 the purchaser
paid value and had no notice is immaterial.
The plaintiffs' allegations and the facts of the case were such that
the court may well have thought that George Vanhoose was not
a bona fide purchaser. Moreover in 1911, before social security,
medicare, and aid to dependent children, when ours was still a
land-based rather than a commercial society, the court would
have been anxious to protect the rights of the widow and the
other children of Abner Fairchild. If so, it is regrettable that
those considerations were ignored in favor of the ossified principle quoted above. 15
In some cases the grantor himself apparently alters an instrument after its execution. Reck v. Clapp' was an action of ejectment by the purchaser of the subject property at an execution
sale in which a judgment had been rendered in the lower court for
defendant Clapp, a bona fide purchaser. In reversing that judgment the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said:
The second point of the plaintiffs was answered by the
court below by their saying in effect, that the defendant
would not be affected by the forgery, because he could
assert the rights of an innocent purchaser without notice if
he used reasonable diligence to obtain access to the original
12.

A similar case is Gioscio v. Lautenschlager, 23 Cal. App. 2d 616,

73 P.2d 1230 (1937) (husband given preference over bona fide purchasers
claiming under forged deed from estranged wife).
13. 145 Ky. 700, 141 S.W. 75 (1911).
14. Id. at 704, 141 S.W. at 76.
15. For similar cases, see Lowther Oil & Gas Co. v. McGuire, 189
Ky. 681, 225 S.W. 718 (1920) (purchaser of father's interest at execution sale
prevailed over bona fide purchasers from son who forged deed from father
to himself); Succession of Rosinski, 158 So. 2d 467 (La. Ct. App. 1963) (defense of bona fide purchaser not available to defendants who held under
will alleged to have been forged by decedent's sister who was defendant's
grantor); Continental Oil Co. v. Walker, 238 Miss. 21, 117 So. 2d 333 (1960)
(purchaser of son's interest preferred over bona fide purchaser of oil and
gas lease claiming under mineral deed forged by father).
16. 98 Pa. 581 (1881).
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paper, but without success, and the title, as recorded, was
fair and free from blemish. The consequences of such a
doctrine would be of a most serious character if it received
the sanction of the courts. For then it would be only
necessary for the forger of a deed or mortgage, after having it placed on record, to lose or destroy the original
instrument and convey his title to an innocent third person for value, pretending to him that the original paper
was mislaid and would be subsequently discovered. Of
course, a purchaser who examines the records is protected
by them as far as they can protect him, but he necessarily takes the risk of having the actual state of the title correspond with that which appears of record.'"
The court in effect subordinates the policy of having safe land
titles reflected by the records to that of discouraging forgery.
It would seem, however, that the deterrence of forgery could best
be accomplished by criminal sanction without compromising the
integrity of the public land records.ls
Lincoln Building & Loan Association v. Cohen 9 involved a
forgery by an agent, one Frankenberger, of the purported grantors, Mrs. Woodward and Mrs. Snyder. When plaintiff Lincoln
Building and Loan Association, a bona fide purchaser, sought to
foreclose its mortgage obtained under the forged deed, the foreclosure action was consolidated with an action by Mrs. Snyder and
Mrs. Woodward to cancel the forged deed and the Association's
mortgage. Although the court held that the Association should
have a lien against the property for the value of benefits received
by Woodward and Snyder from the plaintiff's loan, it said:
The judgment to the extent that it cancelled the deed and
mortgage is correct. A forged deed is void, and, of course
a mortgage is of no higher dignity than the deed on which
it is based. . . . [T] he purchasers from the vendee in a
forged deed obtained no better title than that possessed by
the vendor and are not entitled to the protection afforded to innocent purchasers. . . . It is argued by appellant, however, that Frankenberger was the agent and
attorney of the appellees Mrs. Woodward and Mrs. Snyder,
and that his acts while acting as agent bound his principals
and made them liable to appellant for the entire amount
advanced by it on the real estate. Frankenberger was the
agent of appellees to negotiate a loan to be secured by a
mortgage on the real estate, and after the mortgage had
been executed to deliver it to the mortgagee. He had no
authority, express or implied, to alter the mortgage and,
17. Id. at 585-86.
18. Another case in which a grantor altered a deed is Arrison v.
Harmstead, 2 Pa. 191 (1846), wherein the grantor added a ground rent
reservation without the knowledge of the grantee (Harmstead) and then
recorded. Harmstead prevailed against a subsequent bona fide purchaser
of the ground rent.
19. 292 Ky. 234, 165 S.W.2d 957 (1942).
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certainly, no authority to convert it into a deed. Under the
circumstances the alteration of the instrument 2by
Frank0
enberger is to be regarded as the act of a stranger.
Again there is a smokescreen of question-begging cliches camouflaging the equities of the case. Of course Frankenberger was
not authorized to alter the mortgage, but he did indeed alter it
and Mrs. Snyder and Mrs. Woodward afforded him the opportunity to do so. Perhaps the court thought that elderly ladies
should not be held to too strict account for the actions of those
they engage to transact their business, but what happened to the
maxim that as between two innocent parties he who put it in the
power of another to do the wrong must bear the loss?21
As indicated above, in some cases the forgery nullifies an
essential formality in the execution of an instrument and thereby
voids the instrument itself. Thus, in Kline v. Mueller,22 wherein
a nonexistent notary public had "certified" that plaintiff Mueller's
husband was a single man, the Oklahoma Supreme Court said:
[T]he evidence in impeachment of the [notarized] certificate of acknowledgment was of that quality, as by the controlling rules of law required, to carry conviction to the
judicial mind that the Hanson deed, relied on by defendants as the basic instrument of their title, was a forgery.
23

The court then uttered the usual shibboleths to the effect that a
forged deed is ineffective as
a muniment of title even as to subse24
quent bona fide purchasers.
In Wheelock v. Cavitt 25 the plaintiff contended that a deed,

although purportedly signed and acknowledged by both her husband and herself, had not in fact been signed or acknowledged
by her. The court held that if the acknowledgment was a forgery,
it was not binding upon the plaintiff even in favor of an innocent
purchaser for value without notice.
The rights of property are too sacred to allow them to be
swept away without the knowledge of the owner, when he
20. Id. at 238-39, 165 S.W.2d at 960.
21. In Barbee v. Armory, 106 W. Va. 507, 510, 146 S.E. 59, 61 (1928),
it was said that "this principle has no application in the case of forged
instruments." In that case bona fide purchasers under a forged deed from
Barbee to his agent, Armory, lost to Barbee. See also Graham v. Sinderman, 238 Mich. 210, 213 N.W. 200 (1927). Other cases in which bona fide
purchasers lost their interests acquired under an instrument forged by an
agent are Pry v. Pry, 109 Ill. 466 (1884); Gross v. Watts, 206 Mo. 733, 104
S.W. 30 (1907); Wooldridge v. Powers, 178 Okla. 56, 61 P.2d 734 (1936).
22. 135 Okla. 123, 276 P. 200 (1928).
23. Id. at 129, 276 P. at 206.
24. In a similar case, Haller v. Hawkins, 245 Ill. 492, 92 N.E. 99 (1910),
a bona fide purchaser was subordinated to a dower interest because a deed
in his chain of title falsely recited that the grantor was single when he
was in fact married.
25. 91 Tex. 679, 45 S.W. 796 (1898).
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has made no contract of sale with the pretended purchaser.
No consideration of public policy can justify
the robbing of
26
a married woman of her separate estate.
Again, the above considerations may have had more force in 1898
before the evolution of the various present forms of state-supported social insurance. Even so, the court failed to explain why
the property rights of the subsequent bona fide purchaser, acquired in reliance on the public records, are not as sacred as
those of the plaintiff, presumably acquired in the same manner.
McCarley v. Carter27 involved a forgery in a will calculated to
cut off the rights of a pretermitted child. In holding that plaintiff
McCarley acquired no interest from the forger and devisee under
the will, the court said:
Nor can we sustain appellant in his contention that he
is an innocent purchaser. This court [has] held that one
purchasing land from a person who obtained his 28title by
forgery cannot be treated as an innocent purchaser.
There are, of course, many other cases in which a subsequent
bona fide purchaser has lost rights in real estate because of a
forged instrument in his chain of title.2 9 As in the above cases,
none appears to offer a satisfactory explanation for the result.
They rely for the most part on the rule that a forged deed passes
no title and on citation of older cases. When rationalization of a
decision is offered, it is usually found in the older cases and put
in terms of the prevention of forgery 0 or protection of the victim
of the forgery.3' These considerations, while perhaps cogent in the
nineteenth century, are unpersuasive in the latter half of the twentieth. In addition, a deed or similar instrument is no longer regarded with the same mixture of solemnity and awe that derived
from the social values of an agrarian culture. Therefore, a more
functional approach is required; if an instrument in a bona fide
purchaser's claim has been forged, courts should not be blinded
26. Id. at 684, 45 S.W. at 798, quoting from Pickins v. Knisely, 29
W. Va. 1, 4 (1886). In a similar case, Lee v. Duncan, 220 Miss. 234, 70 So.
2d 615 (1954), the homestead interest of a wife whose signature and
acknowledgment were forged on a mineral deed prevailed over the interests of subsequent bona fide purchasers of the mineral deed. Also see
Lummus v. Alma State Bank, 4 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Colonial
& United States Mortg. Co. v. Thetford, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 152, 66 S.W. 103
(1901); Thompson v. Johnson, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 246, 58 S.W. 1030 (1900).
27. 187 Ark. 282, 59 S.W.2d 596 (1933).
28. Id. at 285, 59 S.W.2d at 597.
29. See, e.g., Tate v. Potter, 216 Ga. 750, 119 S.E.2d 547 (1961); Cole v.
Long, 44 Ga. 579 (1872); Curry v. Hinton, 191 Ky. 681, 231 S.W. 217
(1921); Skupinski v. Provident Mortg. Co., 244 Mich. 309, 221 N.W. 338
(1928); Austin v. Dean, 40 Mich. 386 (1879); King v. DeTar, 112 Neb. 535,
199 N.W. 847 (1924); N.M. Long Co. v. Kenwood Co., 85 Utah 524, 39 P.2d
1088 (1935).
30. See Reck v. Clapp, 98 Pa. 581 (1881).
31. See Wheelock v. Cavitt, 91 Tex. 679, 45 S.W. 796 (1898).
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by the criminal alteration of a solemn legal instrument, but should
look beyond that fact, as most have done, to the justly aroused
expectations engendered by that instrument and the need for
secure land titles in a highly mobile society. Finally, the cases
above demonstrate that the forger is most often a person in some
relationship to the victim. In those cases, it is unthinkable under
any well-reasoned concept of justice that one who fails to record
his joint deed,3 2 or accepts a personal check from an agent as the
proceeds of a mortgage loan,33 or allows an ancestor's will to go
3 4
unprobated for two years while in the hands of another heir,
should prevail over the rights of an innocent purchaser arising in
part from his own carelessness.
B. Fraudulent Releases
A second group of cases involving forgeries or frauds in which
the interests of subsequent bona fide purchasers have been held
defeasible concerns the fraudulent release of a security interest in
the property, usually a mortgage. Insofar as the victim of the
fraud in these cases is less able to prevent the fraudulent act, the
decisions are more persuasive than those concerned with forged
instruments. Yet, in this area also the courts demonstrate a predilection for deciding cases on the basis of absolutist rules without
giving close attention to the facts and equities of each case.
In Lacour v. Ford Investment Co.3 5 a partial release of a mortgage signed by plaintiff Lacour was fraudulently altered to include
certain unreleased properties which were then acquired by subsequent bona fide purchasers. The latter intervened in plaintiff's
mortgage foreclosure suit seeking to enjoin foreclosure. The court
below rendered judgment for the intervenors but the court of
appeals reversed, saying:
In contradistinction to popular legal opinion, the law of
registry does not create rights, but instead makes them effective against third persons. If an act of release of mortgage constituted irrebuttable proof of its own validity irrespective of forgery or material alteration, third persons
would be fully protected in acquiring property in sole
reliance on the public records. However, if this were so,
no title to real property would be safe, since it could be
divested from its true owner through a forged or altered
document by means of the mere recordation thereof."
The above may be true, but why the neglect of the fact that
Lacour executed a release and apparently left it in the hands of
32.

Prater v. Prater, 208 Miss. 59, 43 So. 2d 582 (1949).

33. Lincoln Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Cohen, 292 Ky. 234, 165 S.W.2d 957

(1942).
34.
35.
La. 459,
36.

McCarley v. Carter, 187 Ark. 282, 59 S.W.2d 596 (1966).
183 So. 2d 463 (La. Ct. App. 1966), writ of review denied, 250
196 So. 2d 275 (1967).
183 So. 2d at 466.
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his mortgagor without taking care to see that it was properly recorded? Significantly, the court relied on an earlier Louisiana
case, Zimmer v. Fry,a" in which the defrauded mortgagee never
granted the release which was forged by a notary. In such a case,
admittedly, there is not much a mortgagee can do to prevent a
fraudulent release; perhaps subsequent bona fide purchasers
should be left to their remedies with the title insurance company.
Lest it be thought that the threat to bona fide purchasers of a
fraudulently released mortgage is present only in the civil law
jurisdiction of Louisiana, the case of Farmers & Ginners Cotton
Oil Co. v. Hogan38 is offered for consideration. In that case a
mortgagee sought to cancel a purported satisfaction of his mortgage. The court said: "A forged satisfaction of a mortgage on the
mortgage record is void and not effectual even in favor of one who
has purchased the mortgaged premises in the honest belief that the
satisfaction was in all respects genuine."3' 9
A better justification than the stock phraseology above was
offered for a like result on similar facts in Hellweg v. Bush:4
[I] n practically all these cases, we are dealing with a situation where one of two innocent purchasers must suffer
because of the fraud of another. In such cases, where the
equities are equal in all respects
4 1 save that of time, the first
in point of time should prevail.

If the equities are in fact equal a rule favoring the first in
time might be a proper one. However, close examination of the
cases seldom reveals this equality. On the other hand, in the area
of fraudulent releases 42 the equities will more often be on the side
of the victim of the forgery than in the forged instrument cases,
because the nature of the forgery may give rise to a situation in
which the victim has no notice of the fraudulent release, while the
bona fide purchaser, if he checks the records, does. In such cases
the latter should bear the burden of investigating the authenticity of the release.

37.

190 La. 814, 183 So. 166 (1938).

For other Louisiana cases in

which bona fide purchasers lost to mortgagees whose mortgages had

been fraudulently released of record see Freeland v. Carmouch, 177 La. 395,
148 So. 658 (1933); Gallagher v. Comer, 138 La. 633, 70 So. 539 (1915).
In both cases the forger was the mortgagor.
38. 267 Ala. 248, 100 So. 2d 761 (1957).
39. Id. at 252, 100 So. 2d at 763.
40. 228 Mo. App. 876, 74 S.W.2d 89 (1934).
41. Id. at 882, 74 S.W.2d at 93.
42. Other cases in which the rights of a victim of a fraudulent release
prevailed over those of subsequent bona fide purchasers are: Meyer v.
Ritter, 268 F. 937 (8th Cir. 1920); Luther v. Clay, 100 Ga. 236, 28 S.E. 46
528 (1860); Crecelius v. Home Heights Co.,
(1897); DeWolf v. Hadyn, 24 Ill.
217 S.W. 508 (Mo. 1919); Stratton v. Cole, 203 Mo. App. 587, 216 S.W. 976
(1919).

Fall 1967]

OFF-RECORD RISKS

C. Defrauding of a Grantor
The third off-record risk under the general heading of frauds
and forgeries occurs when a prior grantor in the bona fide purchaser's chain of title has been induced by deceit, overreaching, or
duress to execute an instrument. Typically, these cases involve
aged or illiterate individuals, or persons inexperienced in business
transactions. Often the rationale for the decisions is phrased in
terms of forgery or lack of delivery, the necessary intent of the
grantor being absent. 43 In this area also the cases can best be
decided by an examination of their facts rather than by manipulation of legal pigeonholes. Specifically, these cases call for close
consideration of the circumstances under which the grantor was
fraudulently induced to execute the instrument in question.
A step in this direction seems to have been taken through a
distinction made by many courts between fraud in the factum or
execution and fraud in the treaty or negotiation. A case indicative
of this approach and typical factually of those cases in which the
defrauded grantor has been moved to execute the instrument by
misrepresentations is Parker v. Thomas.44 The court below had
held that a note and trust deed found by the jury to have been
procured by fraud and misrepresentation, but now in the hands of
a defendant bona fide purchaser, were valid obligations. In
awarding a new trial the North Carolina Supreme Court defined
the dominant issue to be whether the transaction constituted fraud
in the factum or fraud in the treaty:
There are . . . certain well-recognized indicia of fraud in

the treaty or negotiations between the parties. These
may be classified as follows: (1) Where there is misrepresentation as to the contents of the instrument and the person signs the identical instrument which he intended to
sign. (2) Where there is undue influence exerted upon
the party signing an instrument; provided of course, he has
legal capacity. (3) Where the complaining party can read
the instrument which he signs, seals, and delivers, but
fails, refuses, or neglects to do so.
There are also well marked indicia of fraud in the
factum, which may be classified as follows: (1) Surreptitious substitution of one paper for another. (2) The false
reading of a deed or other instrument, upon request, to a
blind or illiterate person. (3) Fraud, imposition, or artifice practiced upon the person signing an instrument by
means of which his signature is procured. (4) Where the
execution of the instrument is procured by trick, artifice,
or imposition other than false representation as to the contents of the instrument. (5) Want of identity between the
43. See, e.g., Horvath v. National Mortg. Co., 238 Mich. 354, 213

N.W. 202 (1925) (forgery); Lee v. Parker, 171 N.C. 144, 88 S.E. 217 (1916)
(no delivery).
44. 192 N.C. 798, 136 S.E. 118 (1926).
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instrument executed and the one to be executed. 45
The court further said that if there was fraud in the factum the
deed of trust never existed in contemplation of law and the bona
fide purchaser could not recover upon it. This issue was to be
decided by the jury.
The court's statement above makes sense insofar as it attempts
to distinguish the cases in which the perpetration of the fraud is
beyond the control of its victim from those in which the fraud is
invited by the negligence of the defrauded party. The danger of
deciding cases on the basis of sweeping generalizations is yet inherent in these remarks, however, for example when the surreptitious substitution of one paper for another is made possible by the
negligence of the victim.
In another misrepresentation case, Prather v. LaRue,46 the
court took a less discriminating approach. The case is somewhat
unique in that the actual misrepresentation was made by defendant Prather to plaintiff's grantor and was made possible by a belatedly discovered misdescription in plaintiff's deed. LaRue
brought suit to cancel the fraudulently procured deed of Prather
and the deeds of bona fide purchasers from Prather. The judgment below was for plaintiff and the supreme court affirmed, noting that as the misrepresentation constituted forgery in the second
degree,4 7 the deeds to the bona fide purchasers were also void.4s

This decision is incredible in view of the facts: (1) that LaRue
had two months after his grantor Elliot returned to Oklahoma,
and before the fraudulent procuring of the deed by his grantee
Prather, in which to have Elliot execute and acknowledge a deed to
him with a correct description; (2) that LaRue knew over a year
before the fraudulent acts occurred of the mistaken description,
yet he apparently took no steps to prevent the acquisition of
rights in the land by innocent purchasers; and (3) that it took
LaRue over two years in which to discover the mistaken description in the first place.
Indeed, many of the misrepresentation cases are not compelling
insofar as the fraud could have been exposed upon exercise of
minimum due care by the defrauded grantor, often nothing more
45. Id. at 802-03, 136 S.E. at 120. Other courts have adopted this
approach; see, e.g., Rosenquist v. Harris, 138 F. Supp. 21 (D.N.D. 1956)
(fraud in the treaty, bona fide purchasers prevailed); Nixon v. Nixon, 260
N.C. 251, 132 S.E.2d 590 (1963) (nonsuit against allegedly defrauded plaintiff reversed; dictum that deed procured by fraud in factum is void even
against bona fide purchasers); Dixon v. Kaufman, 79 N.D. 633, 58 N.W.2d
797 (1953) (fraud in the treaty, court held for bona fide purchaser on
fraud issue); Hauck v. Crawford, 75 S.D. 202, 62 N.W.2d 92 (1953) (fraud
in the treaty, lower court decision for defrauded plaintiff as against bona
fide purchasers reversed).
46. 200 Okla. 151, 191 P.2d 214 (1948).
47. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1593 (1958).
48. 200 Okla. at 159, 191 P.2d at 219.
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than reading the instrument. 4 9 Admittedly, such cases as Hegeman v. Fetty,5 in which a notary public participated in the fraud,
and Zahrek v. Gorczyca,51 in which the instrument was misread to
illiterate plaintiffs, present closer decisions and do seem to call for
equitable relief in favor of the victim as against bona fide purchasers.
Another type of case in which a grantor has been defrauded
and then had his interest declared superior to that of a bona fide
purchaser has occurred when the grantor has been tricked into
executing the instrument by overreaching. These cases are similar to the misrepresentation cases, but distinguishable on the
ground that the misrepresentation does not go to the contents of
the instrument executed, but to its effect once executed. Here
especially a judicial tenderness for illiterates and elderly ladies
is present.
In Trout v. Taylor,5 2 for instance, plaintiff Trout, an elderly
woman of limited schooling, was induced to execute a deed in blank
in exchange for worthless stock. In reversing a lower court decision in favor of the bona fide purchasers under the fraudulently
procured deed, the California Supreme Court stated that:
Numerous authorities have established the rule that an
instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, a
forged instrument, or a deed in blank, cannot be made
the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable
doctrine of bona fide purchase. .

.

. Consequently, the fact

that defendant Archer acted in good faith in dealing with
persons who apparently
53 held legal title is not in itself sufficient basis for relief.
The court held that the plaintiff was guilty of neither negligence
49. For other cases involving defrauding of a grantor, in all of which
the grantor was plaintiff and prevailed over the rights of bona fide
purchasers, see Oswald v. Newbanks, 336 Ill.
490, 168 N.E. 340 (1929)
(fraudulent misrepresentation by real estate agent that plaintiff was executing a contract of exchange); Hegeman v. Fetty, 103 Ind. App. 291, 7
N.E.2d 518 (1937) (plaintiff thought she was only executing lease with option to buy; fraud participated in by notary public); Zaharek v. Gorczyca,
87 Ind. App. 309, 159 N.E. 691 (1928) (plaintiffs did not speak English;
agent had them sign a deed misrepresenting it to be a building contract
which he "translated" into Polish for them); McGinn v. Tobey, 62 Mich.
252, 28 N.W. 818 (1886) (question as to purchaser's good. faith); Julia Oil
& Gas. Co. v. Cobb, 128 Okla. 260, 262 P. 650 (1927) (after day-long carousal, agents of bona fide purchaser's grantor induced illiterate plaintiff to
execute deed on pretext that it was an oil and gas lease); Turner v.
Nicholson, 115 Okla. 56, 241 P. 750 (1925) (misrepresentation by plaintiff's
future husband that deed was. timber contract); Smith v. Markiand, 72
Pa. 605, 72 A. 1047 (1909) (deeds signed by grantor on misrepresentation
that they were for purpose of showing potential purchasers that there were
no liens against the property).
50. 103 Ind. App. 291, 7 N.E.2d 518 (1937).
51. 87 Ind.App. 309, 159 N.E. 691 (1928).
52. 220 Cal. 652, 32 P.2d 968 (1934).
53. Id. at 656, 32 P.2d at 970.
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nor laches and said:
The loss resulting from the fraud must fall, therefore,
where the course of business has placed it

....

Defend-

ants Archer and Arnold must seek their recourse54 against
the fraudulent defendants who occasioned the loss.

The court in this decision relied largely on the doctrine that a deed
in blank is absolutely ineffectual to pass title. Yet the plaintiff
did not deny that she fully intended to execute the deed. Why
should the courts make themselves the guardians of credulous persons at the expense of individuals who acquire interests in property in good faith and in reliance upon the records, when the state
invited reliance upon such records? 5
The cases involving a defrauding of the grantor by means of
duress are considerably more persuasive. In Chestnut v. Weekes 6
a deed procured by the putative grantor's doctor after he had
administered a hypodermic needle to the grantor was held to convey no title to a subsequent bona fide purchaser claiming thereunder. The court relied more on the delirium of the grantor precipitated by the duress and on the lack of intended delivery than
on the fraud exercised in procuring the deed. This indicates, perhaps, that when the equities of the case require, more persuasive
legal doctrines than fraud can be marshalled in support of a decision protecting a 57defrauded grantor as against a subsequent
bona fide purchaser.
II.

INCAPACrIy OF A GRANT'oR

After frauds and forgeries the most serious off-record risk
threatening a bona fide purchaser's interest is probably the incapacity of a prior grantor in his chain of title. The cases can be
grouped under three headings: (1) where the grantor's incapacity
derives from mental incompetence; (2) where the incapacity is
due to infancy; and (3) where the incapacity is purely legal in
nature. Of course all three types involve incapacity in a legal
sense, but what distinguishes the third type is that the incapacity
is imposed by operation of law alone rather than derived from an
internal condition of the grantor.
The mental incapacity cases are most persuasive, if not in
terms of their reasoning at least on the basis of their facts. In
54.

Id. at 657, 32 P.2d at 970.

55. For additional cases involving overreaching where bona fide purchasers have had their interests defeated, see Bryce v. O'Brien, 5 Cal. 2d

615, 55 P.2d 488 (1936); Horvath v. National Mortg. Co., 238 Mich. 354,
213 N.W. 202 (1927); Baldridge v. Sunday, 73 Okla. 287, 176 P. 404 (1918).
56. 183 Ga. 367, 188 S.E. 714 (1936).
57. See also Inhabitants of Worcester v. Eaton, 13 Mass. 371, 7 Am.
Dec. 155 (1816) (deed executed under threats of unlawful imprisonment);
Lee v. Parker, 171 N.C. 144, 88 S.E. 217 (1916) (sick grantor's hand held to
deed); Abee v. Bargas, 65 S.W. 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) (sick grantor's
hand held to deed).
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this area also, however, even more than in the area of fraud and
forgeries, it seems courts which have divested bona fide purchasers
of their interests are prone to decide cases by means of conclusionary phrases such as "void deed" and "lack of power to convey"
rather than by close examination of the facts and competing policy
considerations.
A.

Mental Incapacity of a Grantor

The mental incapacity cases are persuasive because the better
reasoned decisions such as Erickson v. Bohne58 cite the lack of
effective delivery or intent to convey on the part of the grantor. 9
Some cases refer to the grantor's lack of understanding of the
nature of the transaction." If a bona fide purchaser is to be deprived of his interest, the most compelling case is when a grantor
never intended, or was incapable of intending, to convey. On
the other hand, there are varying degrees of incompetency; incompetents usually have guardians or relatives to protect their
interests, and a decision against the bona fide purchaser necessarily entails a diminution in the security of the record title and discourages land transactions, or at least makes them more burdensome because of the need for more extensive title checks and title
insurance.
Stallworth v. Ward, 6' for example, is one of the more unconvincing insane grantor cases. The court in holding against
Stallworth, the bona fide purchaser, said:
Nor did . . . Stallworth, though uninformed of Miss

on the
Ward's mental condition and placing full reliance
unimpeachable character of the Florida decree, 62 receiveany better title. The latter deed was also ineffectual to
convey title and the63decree of the trial court must be affirmed in so holding.
Stallworth was awarded restitution, however, from the heirs of the
grantor, who had died before final adjudication of the
insane
64
case.
58. 130 Cal. App. 2d 553, 279 P.2d 619 (1955).
59. Id. at 555, 279 P.2d at 621.
60. E.g., Jones v. Lind, 211 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
61. 249 Ala. 505, 31 So. 2d 324 (1947).
62. A Florida court of competent jurisdiction had recently declared
that when the deed was given the grantor was sane and competent to
transact business. Powell, Stallworth's grantor and the grantee in the
original deed, apparently relied on this decree as conclusive protection
against invalidation. In an earlier phase of the same case, Ward v.
Stallworth, 243 Ala. 651, 11 So. 2d 374 (1943), the court had held that if
Powell had notice of his grantor's mental incapacity, then despite the
Florida decree, his deed was void. At a subsequent trial it was found
that Powell had such notice.
63. 249 Ala. at 508, 31 So. 2d at 326.
64. Id. For other cases holding a bona fide purchaser's interest defeasible because of a mentally incompetent grantor in his chain, see Liv-
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Under the Alabama rule, the rights of a bona fide purchaser
turn on the question whether the grantee in the original deed
from the insane grantor had notice of the insanity. From the point
of view of a subsequent bona fide purchaser, who has no contact
with the insane grantor, this is a meaningless distinction; and for
the purpose of balancing the rights of such a purchaser against
the rights of the insane grantor it is an irrelevant consideration,
except insofar as it may be indicative of the capacity of that
grantor to conduct his own business affairs. The Stallworth
case itself is doubly impeachable in that both the original grantee
and Stallworth relied on a valid adjudication that the grantor was
sane.65
B. Infant Grantor
The cases in which a bona fide purchaser's interest has been
defeated because of the infancy of a prior grantor are much fewer
in number than those dealing with an insane grantor. In Ware v.

Mobley, 66 the most recent case, the Georgia Supreme Court re-

versed a judgment in favor of a bona fide purchaser against an
infant grantor, holding:
In 14 R.C.L. sect. 23, it is stated that "It has frequently
been declared that the right of an infant to avoid his contract is an absolute and paramount right, superior to all
equities of other persons, and may therefore be exercised
against purchasers from the grantee, although they bought
bona fide and without knowledge that their title came
through an infant." In 31 C.J. 1019, it is said that "The
right of avoidance is superior to all equities of other persons, and may therefore be exercised against or regardless
of the existence of, a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee."
•...
What efficacy would there be in a rule that an infant,
on reaching majority, could disaffirm a deed made by
him during his infancy, if the right could be circumvented
by his grantee placing the legal title in a third person for
value and without notice? In order to give vitality to the
doctrine that an infant is incapable of irretrievably alienating his property, it is necessary to hold that he can pursue
his rights even as against an innocent purchaser. The
ingston v. Livingston, 210 Ala. 420, 98 So. 281 (1923) (but bona fide purchasers prevailed because their grantor had acquired title by adverse
possession); Erickson v. Bohne, 130 Cal. App. 2d 553, 279 P.2d 619 (1955);
Gibson v. Westoby, 115 Cal. App. 2d 273, 251 P.2d 1003 (1953); Tate v.
Potter, 216 Ga. 750, 119 S.E.2d 547 (1961); Chestnut v. Weeks, 183 Ga. 367,
188 S.E. 714 (1936); Hull v. Louth, 109 Ind. 315, 10 N.E. 270 (1887); Dewey
v. Algire, 37 Neb. 6, 55 N.W. 276 (1893); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v.
Cochran, 95 Okla. 111, 218 P. 313 (1923); Patterson v. Causey, 119 S.C. 12,
111 S.E. 725 (1922); Jones v. Lind, 211 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948);
Mitchell v. Inman, 156 S.W. 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
65. See note 62 supra.
66. 190 Ga. 249, 9 S.E.2d 67 (1940).
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court erred in instructing the jury to the contrary. 6
Typically, the Ware case is more concerned with the efficacy of
a rule allowing an infant to disaffirm his deed than with balancing the equities of infant and bona fide purchaser. Perhaps there
was more reason for such a rule when education was a sometime
thing and experience the one great teacher. With the progress in
education and the resulting sophistication of "minors" such a rule
is an anachronism. At least, when an infant within two years of
his majority and a bona fide purchaser are involved, as in Ware,
the application of such a rule today would evince a servile allegiance to legal antiquity.
C.

Legal Incapacity

In a few cases the interest of a bona fide purchaser was defeated because a prior grantor was without power to convey for
purely legal reasons. Wall v. Lubbock, 8 for instance, involved
revocation of an agent's authority because of death of the principal. 9 The court vested title in the heirs of the principal as
against the defendants who claimed under the deed executed by the
agent. The defendants' contention that the trial court erred in
refusing to submit the issue of innocent purchaser to the jury was
rejected.
The jury having found that John S. Chiveral was dead
when Frazier, purporting to act as his agent, attempted to
convey the land, that conveyance was void; and, such
being its character, and it being a link in the defendant's
chain of70title, the question of innocent purchaser is not in
the case.
The court further held, in what must surely be a masterpiece of
Draconian decision making, that since a link in defendants' chain
was absolutely void they had no color of title to support a contention of adverse possession, although defendants had apparently
been in continuous possession since 1846.71
67. Id. at 251-52, 9 S.E.2d at 69. For other cases involving an infant
grantor see Buchanan v. Hubbard, 96 Ind. 1 (1884); Sewell v. Sewell, 92
Ky. 500, 18 S.E. 162 (1892); Searcy v. Hunter, 81 Tex. 644, 17 S.W. 372
(1891) (but it was subsequently held in Simpkins v. Searcy, 10 Tex. Civ.
App. 406, 32 S.W. 849 (1895), that the suit brought by the heirs of the
infant grantor to disaffirm. the deed was not brought within a reasonable
time).
68. 52 Tex. Civ. App. 405, 118 S.W. 886 (1909).
69. The plaintiffs Lubbock claimed as heirs of John Chiveral. Defendants Wall claimed under a deed executed by Frazier purporting to act
as agent for Chiveral. The deed records were later destroyed and, although defendants had been in continuous possession, the jury found that
John Chiveral had died before Frazier executed the deed. Title was
vested in the plaintiffs.
70. 52 Tex. Civ. App. at 410, 118 S.W. at 888.
71. Id.
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As in Wall v. Lubboch, the rationale of the legal incapacity
cases seems to be that the doctrine of bona fide purchaser does
not apply to a purchaser of legal title when someone in his chain
was without power to convey.12 Stated thus the doctrine of bona
fide purchaser becomes meaningless because the only time it matters is when someone in the purchaser's chain of title was for some
reason without power to convey good title. In the Bowman 73 and
Daniels7 4 cases the court might have thought that the purchaser
should have made a closer examination of crucial facts bearing on
the validity of his interest. If so, such considerations should have
been the focus of the opinions, not pushed into the background by
meaningless legal rhetoric.
III. LACK

OF AN ESSENTIAL FORMALITY IN THE EXECUTION
OF AN INSTRUMENT

A third group of cases wherein a bona fide purchaser's interest
has been defeated because of an off-record risk involves the absence of an essential formal element in the execution of an instrument in the purchaser's chain of title, that is, lack of delivery
or lack of acknowledgment. These cases often involve forgeries or
frauds which vitiate delivery or acknowledgment. Thus, cases
such as Chestnut v. Weekes,75 Lee v. Parker,76 and Abee v. Bargas, 77 in which the grantor was defrauded and the courts' decisions

were based to a greater or lesser degree on lack of delivery should
be considered under that section below. Also, cases such as Erickson v. Bohne 78 involving an insane grantor where lack of effective
delivery was cited as a reason for voiding the conveyance should
be considered under the lack of delivery section. Similarly, Whee72. See, e.g., Bowman v. Oakley, 212 S.W. 549 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919);
Daniels v. Mason, 90 Tex. 240, 38 S.W. 161 (1896). In the first case the
substitute trustee under certain trust deeds held a foreclosure sale. This
sale was found to have been made without the request of the beneficiary
as required by the trust deeds although there were recitals in the deeds
to the effect that such a request had been made. It was further found
that the purpose of sale was to extinguish certain second lien notes. The
plaintiffs, holders of the second lien notes, were held to be entitled to a
sale of the land as against defendants who deraigned their title from the
void foreclosure sale. In the second case, Daniels v. Mason, supra, the
plaintiff bought the land in question from a married woman, but had no
notice that her grantor was under coverture. The grantor's husband did
not join in the deed. In an action to remove a cloud on plaintiff's title
asserted by her grantor's heirs the Texas Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff was not entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser and reversed the decision of the lower courts in her favor.
73. Cited in note 72 supra.
74.

Id.

75. 183 Ga. 367, 188 S.E. 714 (1936).
76. 171 N.C. 144, 88 S.E. 217 (1916).
77. 65 S.W. 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901).
78. 130 Cal. App. 2d 553, 279 P.2d 619 (1955).
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lock v. Cavitt

9

and related cases 0 which involve forged acknowl-

edgments should be considered under the lack of acknowledgment
section.
The underlying rationale of the lack of delivery cases is that
the grantor never intended to make the conveyance. Thus, in
Steffian v. Milmo NationalBank8 l it was said:
To complete a delivery in its legal sense, two elements
are

. . .

essential.

The instrument must not only be placed

within the control of the grantee, but this must be done
by the grantor with the intention that it shall become
operative as a conveyance. It follows from these first
principles that an instrument which passes into the possession of the grantee, without such intention on the part
of the grantor is wholly inoperative; and that a purchaser
from the former acquires in law no title to the property
which it purports to convey. It is accordingly held that
even a vendee from the grantee who has paid value without knowledge of the facts is not an innocent purchaser in
such a case.8 2
As suggested above in the discussion of the off-record risk of an
insane grantor, the fact that a grantor did not intend to convey is
probably as persuasive a reason as can be urged against the rights
of a bona fide purchaser. However, many of the cases referred to
in this article involve grantors who did not intend to convey in
one sense or another; the crux of the problem in the delivery
cases as elsewhere should be whether, despite his intentions, the
grantor wittingly or unwittingly created a situation which made
possible the intervention of a bona fide purchaser's rights.
The lack of acknowledgment cases are much less satisfactory
than those involving lack of delivery. The reasoning runs something like this: a deed which is unacknowledged is void; therefore a bona fide purchaser can acquire no rights under it. The
courts in these cases, as in the cases dealing with forgeries and
frauds, seem so blinded by a defect in the execution of the instrument as to be unable to see beyond that to the competing equities.
Two policy considerations which do favor the grantor or those
claiming under him are the protection of homestead rights and
the prevention of undue influence exerted by a husband upon his
wife. But usually these considerations are merely cited without
any examination of their relevance to the factual context of the
case.
A.

Lack of Delivery

The typical lack of delivery case concerns an escrow arrange79. 91 Tex. 679, 45 S.W. 796 (1898).
80. See cases cited note 26 supra.
81. 69 Tex. 503, 6 S.W. 823 (1888).
82. Id. at 518, 6 S.W. at 824.
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ment in which the instrument is wrongfully procured by the
grantee. Thus, in Mosley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 8 the plaintiffs whose mineral deed had been tortiously procured from escrow
by the grantee of an option were held entitled to cancellation of
deeds deraigned therefrom despite the fact that the defendant
petroleum company was a bona fide purchaser. The New Mexico
Supreme Court stated:
The deed in question was void for three reasons:
First, it was never delivered; second, it was fraudulently
obtained from the escrow holder without complying with
the escrow agreement .

.

. ; and third, the unauthorized

substitution of Burke's name as grantee for that of Asbury
was a material alteration of an undelivered deed, and destroyed its force as a conveyance; and defendants who
purport to have paid value without knowledge of the invalidity of the Burke deed are not protected.... 4
A land owner is neither estopped to claim title nor is
he barred from asserting it by laches, if his only fault is
failure to sue to expunge from the public records a forged
or void deed to land in the actual possession of no one,
which he neither made nor had recorded; although he
knew, or should have known, that one of the public unknown to him might purchase the property, assuming the
validity of the record of the void instrument. 5
In a strong, correct dissent it was argued that the plaintiffs' conduct and defendant's position should have led to affirmance of
the trial court decree against the plaintiffs.8 6
Another group of lack of delivery cases does not involve escrow arrangements but merely the wrongful procuring of an executed instrument by the grantee. Such a case is Watts v. Archer,87 where there was both coercion to sign the deed and a subsequent wrongful taking by the plaintiff's grantor. The Iowa Supreme Court in holding against the bona fide purchaser quoted
from 16 AM. JUR. Deeds section 12:
"Unless the grantor has ratified the deed by his acts
83.
84.
85.
86.

45 N.M. 230, 114 P.2d 740 (1941).
Id. at 242, 114 P.2d at 748 (emphasis original).
Id. at 252. 114 P.2d at 754.
Id. at 263, 114 P.2d at 761 (dissenting opinion).

For other cases

in which a bona fide purchaser's interest was held defeasible because of
wrongful procuring of an instrument in escrow, see Houston v. Forman,

92 Fla. 1, 109 So. 297 (1926); Jackson v. Lynn, 94 Iowa 151, 62 N.W. 704
(1895); Golden v. Hardesty, 93 Iowa 622, 61 N.W. 913 (1895); Blakeney
v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 192 Okla. 158, 135 P.2d 339 (1943); Home
Stake Royalty Corp. v. McClish, 187. Okla. 352, 103 P.2d 72 (1940); Clevenger v. Moore, 126 Okla. 246, 259 P. 219 (1927); Hapgood v. City Nat'l Bank,
230 S.W. 775 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); Houston Land & Trust Co. v. Hubbard,
37 Tex. Civ. App. 546, 85. S.W. 474 (1904). See also Montgomery v. Bank
of America, 85 Cal. App. 2d 559, 193 P.2d 475 (1948).
87. 252 Iowa 592, 107 N.W.2d 549 (1961).
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since the grantee obtained the custody of it or is estopped
from asserting that the deed was never delivered, an undelivered deed is inoperative even in favor of an innocent
purchaser or of one who had no notice that a deed in his
chain of title had never been delivered. Thus, a subsequent purchaser for value without
notice can acquire no
8
right or title under a stolen deed.

The above reasoning is persuasive because in a case like Watts the
bona fide purchaser is placed in the position of a receiver of stolen
goods. When the grantor has not himself contributed to his loss, as
in King v. Diffeys 9 and Garner v. Risinger,90 justice would seem
to require a return of the stolen property even at the expense of
subsequent innocent purchasers. Not only is the maxim "first in
time, first in right" applicable, but practically, the bona fide purchaser is usually in a much better position to investigate the validity of his grantor's title than is the innocent party who has been
wrongfully deprived of his interest. The need for secure record
title, however, requires that the burden of proof be on the party
seeking to defeat the interest of a subsequent grantee after the
latter has proven himself to be a bona fide purchaser.
B.

Lack of Acknowledgment

The typical lack of acknowledgment case is Wheelock v. Cavitt,91 where the acknowledgment is defective because it is a
forgery. In other cases the acknowledgment was on record, as
in the forgery cases, but found for one reason or another to be
defective by subsequent judicial inquiry.
Thus, in Dixon v. Kaufman 2 the grantors were not present
when the acknowledgment certificate was executed by the notary.
Therefore, it was held that:
The mineral deed to Kaufman was absolutely void as to
the homestead because it was not acknowledged as the
statute prescribes and the bona fide purchasers from Kaufman obtained no title with respect to the homestead minerals. As to the remainder of the land, the deed was voidable and subject to being set aside as to Kaufman but it is
Valid and enforceable as to the rights93of those defendants
who are innocent purchasers for value.
88. Id. at 597, 107 N.W.2d at 551. For other cases in which a bona fide
purchaser's interest has been held subject to defeasance because of a wrongful procuring of a deed -from the grantor,. see Gould v. Wise, 97 Cal. 532,
32 P. 576 (1893); Taylor v. Davis, 72 Mo. 291 (1880); King v. Diffey, 192
S.W. 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); Garner v. Risinger, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 378,
81 S.W. 343 (1904); Steffian v. Milmo Nat. Bank, 69 Tex. 513, 6 S.W.
824 (1888).
89. 192 S.W. 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917),
90. 35 Tex. Civ. App. 378, 81 S.W. 343 (1904).
91. 91 Tex. 679, 45 S.W. 796 (1898).
92. 79 N.D. 633, 58 N.W.2d 797 (1953).
93. Id. at 649, 58 N.W.2d at 806 (emphasis added). See also Logue v.
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One authority has said that "the purpose of the homestead laws
is to provide a safeguarded base for family living and for family
operation. 9' 4 Whatever the merits of such a policy in modern real
property law, its extension in acknowledgment cases to mineral
interests as in Dixon at the expense of subsequent innocent purchasers is highly questionable. Why must a safeguarded base for
family living include the windfall of a valuable mineral interest
beneath the "homestead" surface when the rights of a bona fide
purchaser have intervened? If the development of mineral resources is to be encouraged, the burden of investigating the circumstances of every acknowledgment in every preceding deed
should not be placed on the oil or gas company. Likewise, the
policy of requiring a wife's separate acknowledgment privately before a notary to insure her genuine acquiescence in a conveyance
of jointly held property seems blatantly irrelevant to a case such
as Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Downey,95 where the wife apparently concurred in the transaction but is seeking to reacquire a
valuable mineral interest at an innocent purchaser's expense.
IV.

MECHANICS' LIENs

Another off-record risk is posed by mechanics' liens which
take effect against subsequent bona fide purchasers on the date
when the mechanic first furnishes his labor or materials, although
they need not be recorded until thirty to sixty days after completion of the work. The policy underlying the enforcement of such
liens against bona fide purchasers is a salutary one involving protection of those whose labor has added to the value of the property, 90 but it could be realized without detriment to bona fide
purchasers simply by requiring the mechanic to file notice of his
potential claim at the commencement of his labor or furnishing of
materials for it to be valid against subsequent innocent purchasers.
Although it is true that inspection of the premises will sometimes,
though not always, reveal the possible existence of mechanics'
liens, the relation back doctrine of such liens serves, inter alia,
to mislead innocent purchasers.
Thus, in Rural Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Hope Dale Realty
Co., 97 the North Carolina Supreme Court enforced a mechanic's lien
against innocent subsequent purchasers, noting that:
Von Almen, 379 il.
208, 40 N.E.2d 73 (1942) (mineral interests of bona fide
purchasers defeated by homestead rights of original grantor when mineral
deed was acknowledged before notary who had a financial interest in the
transaction); Dokter v. Crawford, 65 N.W.2d 691 (N.D. 1954) (grantors purportedly acknowledged but did not appear before notary); Humble Oil &
Ref. Co. v. Downey, 143 Tex. 171, 183 S.W.2d 426 (1944).
94. 1 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 450 (1965).
95. 143 Tex. 171, 183 S.W.2d 426 (1944).
96. See Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Basnight, 234 N.C. 347, 67
S.E.2d 390 (1951).
97. 263 N.C. 641, 140 S.E.2d 330 (1965).
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In North Carolina, and in other jurisdictions, a laborers' and materialmen's lien on property takes priority
over all the property conveyances to purchasers for value
and without notice subsequent to the time when labor and
materials are furnished, provided notice of the lien is filed
for record within the statutory time, and action to enforce
the lien is instituted within the statutory time.98
The court also stated that:
To hold plaintiff's liens invalid would permit appellants
to take advantage of their failure to follow the prudent
practice of requiring Hope Dale to furnish proof that it had
obtained releases from laborers, mechanics, and materialmen for the specific houses they bought from it, before
they paid the money to it for such houses. If Hope Dale
. . . perpetrated a legal wrong on appellants to the effect

that all the mechanics', laborers', and materialmen's liens
had been paid by Hope Dale on these houses when they
had not been paid, they must seek redress from the doer
of the legal wrong. 9
It is submitted, however, that the prudent practice of requiring
proof of releases from mechanics' liens merely representsanother
clog in the free flow of real estate in commerce and is not a very
satisfactory means of protection for bona fide purchasers. Fraud
is always a possibility, or the purchaser may be misled by the appearance of the property into believing that there are no outstanding liens against it and, as was true in Rural Plumbing, the
seller may be insolvent.
The failure to accommodate the policy underlying mechanics'
liens with those manifested in the recording acts is another of those
instances prevalent throughout the field of off-record risks where
ancient doctrines continue their absolute reign without regard to
present needs. Of course, the risk in this instance is perpetuated
in part by the insistence of a politically powerful industry on a
procedure which it finds expedient. Moreover, it may be impractical to require immediate recording of a mechanic's lien below a
certain amount-fifty or one hundred dollars. In such cases the
risk to bona fide purchasers is minimal, and the imposition of a
possibly excessive burden on small businesses and recorders is
avoided. Yet, with respect to major construction jobs there is no
reason, given the minimum education required before implementing any legal change, for not exacting the small expenditure and
effort involved in immediate recordation. If necessary, provision
could be made for lower recording fees and for an informal recording, perhaps by telephone if a method for preventing abuses
could be developed. In any event, secure record title and resultant
benefits to commerce, and therefore to the construction industry,
more than offset the disadvantages of requiring those favored
98.
99.

Id. at 653, 140 S.E.2d at 339.
Id. at 656, 140 S.E.2d at 340-41.
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with special status as creditors to record before their liens are
effective against bona fide purchasers.
The Rural Plumbing decision and others like it,100 however, are
probably correct in the context of present recording acts. The defendants had received the value of the plaintiff's labor, and it is
better that they, in effect, pay twice for such labor than that defendants go unpaid.
V.

UNRECORDED FAMILY RIGHTS

Certain family rights not appearing of record may operate to
deprive a bona fide purchaser of his interest in realty. These rights
include the rights of a pretermitted or after-born child of a decedent and the dower and community property rights of a spouse.
The homestead interest may also operate as an off-record risk and
might well have been considered under this heading, but since the
homestead cases are decided in terms of lack of acknowledgment
by a necessary party, reference here will only be made to the
homestead cases discussed and cited previously in the acknowledgment section.
It should be noted, however, that the homestead interest may
operate as an off-record risk in two ways.10 1 The first occurs when
there is a misrepresentation of the grantor's true marital status and
1 2

the wife, or the lawful wife, does not join in the conveyance.
The second may occur when there is confusion or lack of knowledge as to property covered by the homestead interest.1"3
The rationale underlying the preference for holders of other
unrecorded family rights over bona fide purchasers, although rarely articulated, appears similar to that which underlies the homestead and some of the forgery and fraud cases. These family interests were the reasonable product of a society in which land was
the principal form of wealth and represented an attempt to provide some form of social security for surviving spouses and children. 04 Thus, courts in the latter nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries probably thought that they were implementing enlightened social policy when they rendered decisions declaring such
interests capable of defeating the interests of bona fide purchasers.
But again, society has outgrown its land-based origins, other means

100. See, e.g., White v. Chaffin, 32 Ark. 59 (1877); State Bank v.
Plummer, 54 Colo. 144, 129 P. 819 (1912); Cogel v. Mickaw, 11 Minn. 475
(1866); McNeal Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Howland, 111 N.C. 615, 16 S.E. 857
(1892); Keating Implement & Machine Co. v. Marshall Elec. Light &
Power Co., 74 Tex. 604, 12 S.W. 489 (1889).
101. See 2 T. PATTON, TITLES 207 (2d ed. 1957).
102. See Haller v. Hawkins, 245 Ill. 492, 92 N.E. 99 (1910) & note 24
supra.
103. See Bowman v. Bowman, 201 Okla. 384, 206 P.2d 582 (1949).
104. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 94, at 140; 4 R. POWELL, supra note 94,
at 673-74.
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of providing for dependents now exist, and the need for clear
land titles is presently a more compelling social policy than giving
dependents a share of the old home place without regard to intervening interests. Therefore, if there are to be such family interests in real property, it is submitted that provision for their recordation or for their extinguishment if they are not pursued within a short time after they become effective be made10 5 and that,
in any event, the rights of bona fide purchasers should generally
prevail over such interests.
A.

Dower

Dower does not seem to be a favored interest of modern
courts10 6 and only a few cases were found in which dower rights or
their equivalent defeated interests of subsequent bona fide purchasers. In Bridgeford v. Groh10 7 the lawful wife, who had been
separated from her husband for twelve years, was held to have a
one-half fee interest in lands which her husband bought and then
conveyed to his bigamous second wife. "[T]itle came to the defendants from the reputed wife to whom the prior deed had been
made and there was nothing to indicate to them that she was not
the lawful spouse of her husband; indeed, everything indicated that
she was. Defendants paid her full value for the land."' 0 8 The
court further said that "a grantee under such circumstances should
not be made to suffer beyond the clear requirements of the law," 109
but, in view of the facts of the case it is incredible that the law
required any suffering by bona fide purchasers. Why should a
woman, who for the last twelve years of her husband's life had
105. See Hutchinson v. Olderding, 150 Iowa 604, 130 N.W. 139 (1911).
106. See 2 R. POWELL, supra note 94, § 170.23.
107. 306 Pa. 566, 160 A. 451 (1932).
108. Id. at 572-73, 160 A. at 452. See Johnson v. Stephens, 240 Ala. 419,
199 So. 828 (1941) (bill by a widow to have a tax sale declared fraudulent
and to sell land for division).

The Johnson court stated:
If the alleged tax sale was collusive it did not serve to cut off
her [plaintiff's] dower, and the purchaser at that tax sale will in
equity be treated as a voluntary alienee of her husband under the
influence of section 7450 Code. And she may have a dower right
... even though the tax sale was not collusive. Whether a tax
sale of the land of her husband bars her right to dower has had
much consideration by the courts. Many of them hold that if the
tax sale statute provides for a sale of the right, title and interest
of the husband, as our statute. .

. ,

notwithstanding the revenue

act, such as our [s] . . . provides that the tax lien shall be superior
to all other liens since the inchoate right to dower is said not to be
a lien.
Id. at 421, 199 So. at 829 (emphasis original). The Johnson court's reversal
of the lower court decree sustaining a demurrer to the bill, however, was
based on the fact that the widow's action was not barred by the statute
of limitations as the lower court had held. Dower interests apparently
need not be recorded in Alabama.
109. 306 Pa. at 573, 160 A. at 452.
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been effectively divorced from him, be permitted to assert dower
rights against innocent purchasers?
B. Rights of Pretermittedor After-Born Children
Conroy v. Conroy"10 was a suit in trespass to try title by a
pretermitted child against, among others, the holder of a trust deed
who allegedly took the lien in good faith and without notice of
any claim by plaintiff. In reversing dismissal of the suit by the
lower courts on the theory that it was a collateral attack on probate and therefore the court did not have jurisdiction, the Texas
Supreme Court said:
[L] et us assume that the written will of Mrs. Conroy read
as follows: "I, Thalia Conroy, hereby devise and bequeath
unto my husband, R. E. Conroy, all of my estate. If at my
death I should leave a child born after the execution of this
will, then this instrument shall have no effect as to said
child, unless such child shall die before attaining the age
of twenty-one years. In that event this will shall be binding and shall vest all of my estate in my said husband,
R. E. Conroy. But in the event such child, if any, shall
attain the age of twenty-one years, then this will, in so
far as it affects the legal rights of said child, shall be null
and void." No one would doubt that such an instrument
would be entitled to probate, and nothing would be
added to or taken from its effect by reason of its admission
to probate. It being true that the [pretermitted child]
statute becomes engrafted upon the will as an unwritten
part of the same, it follows, in this instance, that the instrument as probated, With the statute superimposed
thereon, reads, in substance, exactly as set out above.
It necessarily follows that there can be no innocent
purchaser in a case of this kind."1
The Conroy case exemplifies the most pernicious effect of the rights
of pretermitted children on bona fide purchasers. Lands are devised under a will, innocent purchasers acquire rights therein, and
some twenty years later the pretermitted child upon attaining his
majority brings suit to enforce his claim on the property. The
child's interest is held to have "vested" upon probate of the will
in the manner set forth in Conroy, or upon death of the ancestor
through inheritance, the will being held inoperative as to the
child.' 1 2 Therefore, the interest of the "subsequent" purchaser
who cannot be a bona fide purchaser is subject to defeasance by
the child's "prior" right. It is submitted that if this method of
110. 130 Tex. 508, 110 S.W.2d 570 (1937).
111. Id. at 512-13, 110 S.W.2d at 570.
112. For other pretermitted heir cases using this approach to hold subsequent purchaser's rights subject to defeasance, see Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v.
Wasserman,.22 F. 872 (C.C. Neb. 1885); Rowe v. AUlison, 87 Ark. 206, 112
S.W. 395 (1908); Smith v. Olmstead, 88 Cal. 582, 26 P. 521 (1891); Smith
v. Rovertson, 89 N.Y. 556 (1882).
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deciding cases by legal word-magic is to be used in contests between pretermitted children and subsequent purchasers, some provision should be made at probate for putting subsequent purchasers on notice.
C. Community Property Rights
In Bowman v. Bowman,1 '3 homestead and community property
rights both operated to divest bona fide purchasers of their interest
in the realty. In reversing a lower court decree for the latter and
canceling their deed, the court remarked:
All of the findings of the trial court were for the plaintiff, except the very important one that Mr. Jones and his
wife were the only innocent persons involved in the litigation and should be protected. In this the court erred, as
the record title was sufficient to put the Joneses on notice
that the plaintiff might have some interest in the land,
since it was shown to have been acquired during coverture
and after our community property law became effective in
1945.11
Disregarding entirely the grantees of T. P. Bowman, was
Ollie Bowman or T. P. Bowman entitled to the land in
question? The undisputed evidence shows it was acquired
during coverture. We conclude that by no principle of
equity or justice could the court have deprived Ollie Bowman of the land as between her and her husband, even if
the homestead issue should be eliminated from consideration; and Mr. and Mrs. Jones could acquire no greater
interest than that of their grantor, T. P. Bowman. 1 5
With record title in the husband and the other facts of the case
as they were,'16 one wonders by what process of mental telepathy
the Joneses were put on notice of plaintiff's claim. Here again is
a case where the plaintiff has contributed to, or at least acquiesced
in, a situation misleading to subsequent purchasers and then is
113.
114.
115.

201 Okla. 384, 206 P.2d 582 (1949).
Id. at 387, 206 P.2d at 584 (emphasis added).
Id. at 388, 206 P.2d at 585.

116. Plaintiff was defendant Bowman's common law wife. On July
11, 1947, she commenced this action against her husband for divorce and

settlement of property rights. The Joneses were subsequently added as
additional defendants. The real estate had been acquired during the period
of the Bowmans' marriage and paid for with Mrs. Bowman's money, but
record title was in Mr. Bowman. The property in question had no house
on it, only a livable garage in which Mr. Bowman lived from January to
April, 1946, and in which Mrs. Bowman, who worked nights, sometimes
slept during the day. On July 19, 1947, defendant Bowman, not having yet
been served with summons or restraining order in this action, conveyed to
the Joneses. At that time the Bowmans were no longer living on the
property and apparently had not done so since April, 1946. Of course the
Joneses were technically on notice of lis pendens, but the Bowman court
seemed to rely mainly on the issue of community property and homestead.
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permitted to recover against such purchasers despite her negligence.
VI.

PRIOR ADVERSE POSSESSION AND UNDISCLOSED EASEMENTS

Unrecorded rights in land may be acquired by adverse possession. Subsequent to the acquisition of such rights the owner
thereof may abandon possession so that a subsequent bona fide
purchaser has no means of ascertaining their existence either by
an examination of the public records or of the premises. Nevertheless, courts have held the interest of the bona fide purchaser
defeasible by the rights of the adverse possessor. Similarly, unrecorded easements not revealed by an examination of the premises
may have been acquired by adjoining owners through prescription
or implication, and there are cases holding that such easements
will, pro tanto, defeat the interest of a bona fide purchaser.
The easement cases are least disturbing because they are
grounded on doctrines of public necessity and convenience: they
usually involve drains or rights of way. Furthermore, the damage to the bona fide purchaser's interest is often nominal, as in
the case of a properly constructed underground drain. When an
open right of way or road is involved, the contention of a subsequent bona fide purchaser that he was without notice would
not appear to be well taken.1 17 On the other hand, the prior adverse possession cases are less satisfactory. The doctrine of adverse possession is said to rest "upon social judgments that there
should be a restricted duration for the assertion of 'aging claims,'
and that the elapse of a reasonable time should assure security to
a person claiming to be owner."11
Perhaps there is also a social
utility theory inherent in the doctrine: that one advancing society's net worth by making use of land should be preferred over
the record owner who for a long time has abandoned the land and
would allow it to be undeveloped. When the adverse possessor
himself has abandoned the property, however, and the record owner reasserts his claim by conveying to a bona fide purchaser who
presumably will use the property, the considerations favoring the
adverse possessor are not so compelling. They become even
less so when secure record title to land is a social objective.
A.

PriorAdverse Possession

Mugaas v. Smith"1 9 illustrates the problems engendered by this
off-record risk. In affirming a judgment for the adverse possessor
against the bona fide purchasers, the court said:
The fact that the respondent had ceased to use the
strip in question in such a way that her claim of adverse
117.
118.
119.

See, e.g., Heard v. Bowen, 184 S.W. 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
6 R. POWELL, supra note 94, at 709.
33 Wash. 2d 429, 206 P.2d 332 (1949).
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possession was apparent, did not divest her of the title
she had acquired. Appellants' principal contention is that
we have held, in a long line of cases, that a bona fide purchaser of real property may rely upon the record title. The
cases cited by appellants construe our recording statute
...

, and involve contests between those relying upon

record title and those relying upon a prior unrecorded conveyance as conveyances are defined by [the statute]. The
holdings in the cases cited give effect to that provision
• . . which states that any unrecorded conveyance ".

.

. is

void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee
in good faith and for a valuable consideration from the
same vendor, his heirs or devisers, of the same real property or any portion thereof whose conveyance is first duly
recorded."
[But] appellants cite no cases, and we have found none
supporting their contention that, under a recording statute . .

.

. a conveyance of the record title to a bona fide

purchaser
will extinguish a title acquired by adverse pos120
session.
The Mugaas case bears, in light of its facts,1 21 certain indicia of a legally sanctioned holdup on the part of the plaintiff. The case is
yet another example of the mechanical application of hoary legal
doctrines precluding consideration of possibly supervening equities
of bona fide purchasers. The facts of some prior adverse possession cases might be said to require a decision for the prior adverse
possessor over the bona fide purchaser,'1 22 but Mugaas v. Smith is
not such a case. Certainly, the court's implication that defendants
should have inquired of plaintiff as to the boundary line places an
excessive, unnecessary burden on bona fide purchasers when the
23
records seem to clearly indicate the boundaries of their property.
120.

Id. at 431-32, 206 P.2d at 334.

121. Mugaas claimed title by adverse possession to a narrow strip
between her property and that of defendants dating back to 1910. Between 1910 and 1928 a fence clearly marked the boundary line for which
plaintiff contended, but this fence had disintegrated over the years. When
defendants purchased the property in 1941 by legal description and with
record title to the disputed land in their vendor, there was no fence and
nothing to mark the dividing line between the property of defendants and
plaintiffs or to indicate to defendants that plaintiff was claiming title to the
strip in question. The defendants subsequently built a house encroaching
on the disputed strip although plaintiff had notified them as to her claim
before any work was done on the strip or the house encroaching on the
strip was set in place. Although the court does not say, defendants had
started work on the house, but not that part lying on the strip, before
plaintiff gave them notice.
122. See, e.g., Fairley v. Howell, 159 Miss. 665, 131 So. 109 (1930)

(the prior adverse possessor had a recorded deed which because not properly acknowledged did not operate as constructive notice and the bona

fide purchaser had not been in continuous possession).
123. For other adverse possession cases, see Louri v. David, 134 Miss.

296, 98 So.. 684 (1924); Bowles v. Ryan, 277 S.W. 760 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925):
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Undisclosed PrescriptiveEasements

14
In McKeon v. Brauner,"
a case involving an underground
water drain, the court held for the prescriptive easement owner:
[W] hat will we say as to an easement that is created by
implication or prescription, and hence not subject to recordation, and is of such nature that it cannot be seen or is
not apparent from any marks on the servient land? Will
the bona fide purchaser for value of the servient estate
without actual notice take title free from the servitude?
Will such a transfer work an extinguishment of the easement? If so, then the acquisition of such an easement, by
prescription or by implication, the character of which is
not apparent, is of little value. In such a situation there
are two innocent parties. On the one hand we have the
innocent purchaser, in the sense that he purchased the
servient estate without notice of an easement that was
not apparent. On the other hand we have the owner of the
dominant estate in full possession of an easement that is
not apparent, which he has gained by prescription or one
which the law will imply upon a severance. He has no instrument to record that will give constructive notice to
prospective purchasers of the servient estate. It is difficult to see how plaintiffs or their grantor in this case could

give actual notice to anyone. .

. The McKeons were un-

der no duty to notify R. D. 12Holliday's
prospective grantee
5
that they held this easement.

The court also pointed out that "an easement appurtenant is an
incorporeal right that does not carry title to the servient land and
the possessor of the servient
land is not dispossessed of his land
126

by reason of the servitude.'
As the court indicates,' 2

7

the problem could be resolved by

bringing prescriptive and implied easements within the recording
acts as some states have done. It is submitted that this should
be done everywhere. Since the McKeons could not record their
easement, however, the decision is probably correct. They needed
the drain to properly farm their land, their crops had been damaged for lack thereof, and the easement did not seem to impose
an excessive burden on the servient estate. The McKeons also had
a duty to keep the drain in good repair so as not to injure Braumer's lands.128 Finally, such rights, even when enforced against
bona fide purchasers without notice, appear justifiable on the
ground of land planning policy and resource allocation in an integrated society."'
124.
125.
125.
127.
128.
(1901).
129.

238 Iowa 113, 29 N.W.2d 518 (1947).
Id. at 113, 29 N.W.2d at 522-23.
Id. at 125, 29 N.W.2d at 525.
Id. at 126, 29 N.W.2d at 525.
See Stuyvestant v. Early, 58 App. Div. 242, 246, 68 N.Y.S. 752, 753
Other cases where prescriptive easements were enforced against
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C. Undisclosed Implied Easements
An implied easement arises when the owner of two parcels
employs one in such a way as to create a servitude on the other
and later transfers one parcel without specific grant or reservation
of the easement in the conveyance. 13 0 Such easements have sometimes been enforced against bona fide purchasers; for example, in
Wiesel v. Smira,131 a case involving an underground sewer, the
court said:

Once conceding the existence of an easement by severance of the quasi dominant and quasi servient tenements,
we see no way by which the owner of the latter can convey it even to an innocent purchaser freed from said easement without the knowledge or approval of the owner of
the dominant tenement. Rights in real property can not be
thus divested. Admittedly there is hardship upon complainants in a case like the present one, but by reason
thereof the court is not warranted in destroying respondents' settled property rights and saying to them that they
can secure as good results by a different use of their property which they are under no obligation to make. So to do
would be an arbitrary exercise of power which is not
warranted, however desirable
and simple the making of
132
new connections may be.
The court also noted that though the easement was not apparent
in a visible sense, it was apparent in that disappearance of waste
133
from the dominant estate was evident.
Although the last sentence in the quotation above may be open
to objection in some cases, the considerations which justify enforcement of prescriptive easements against innocent purchasers
without notice in those states with no provision for recording
such easements would seem to apply also to implied easements.
Again, however, it is suggested that provision for recording should
be made in those states in which this has not been done.

VII. FAILURE TO INQUIRE WITH RESPECT TO POSSESSION NOT ON ITS
FACE INCONSISTENT WITH PURCHASER'S RIGHTS
When facts suffice to impose a duty of investigation on a purchaser of real property, he is placed on notice of what the investibona fide purchasers include Shaughnessy v. Leary, 162 Mass. 108, 38
N.E. 197 (1894) (underground drain); Heard v. Bowen, 184 S.W. 234 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1916) (a road of which purchaser should have had notice); cf.
Croker v. Lewis, 217 Ga. 762, 125 S.E.2d 50 (1962); Ferguson v. Standley,
89 Mont. 489, 300 P. 245 (1931). See also Snell v. Levitt, 110 N.Y. 595, 18
N.E. 370 (1888) (holding that an easement contained in a bona fide purchaser's recorded title was extinguished by prescription).
130. McKeon v. Braumer, 238 Iowa 113, 119, 39 N.W.2d 518, 522 (1947).
131. 49 R.I. 246, 142 A. 148 (1928).
132. Id. at 254, 142 A. at 151.
133. Id. at 251, 142 A. at 150.
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gation would have disclosed whether or not it was actually made.
One fact said to impose a duty of investigation upon a purchaser is
that possession is in one other than the vendor.134 Such possession,
however, even if in another, may still be consistent with the title
of the purchaser's grantor. One example is when the possessor is
the grantor's former lessee. Some authorities have held that occupation of this kind, consistent with the record title, does not put
the purchaser on notice 135 although, as shall be seen, other authorities do not so hold. Similarly, there may be an encroachment by
an adjoining owner on the purchaser's property as described in
the records. This encroachment might be under an unrecorded contract with the purchaser's vendor and not discoverable except by
an exact survey. Here again a purchaser may be held to be on
notice even though the possession is not prima facie inconsistent
with record title.
In effect, then, these conditions create off-record risks for
bona fide purchasers of interests in real property. But the cases
are not decided in such terms, for it is always held that the
purchaser was put on notice by the possession of the conflicting
claimant. It is submitted that to apply the doctrine of notice by
possession in such cases is unrealistic. A purchaser should be
entitled to rely on the public records and, when the physical facts
are prima facie consistent with those records, should not be required to go beyond them to ascertain the possible existence of
hidden off-record claims.
Bump v. Dahl' 16 was an encroachment case by an adjoining
owner who claimed under an oral contract with the purchaser's
vendor, Haley. The supreme court held for the adjoining owner:
Bump's possession was so open and notorious as to be
notice to all the world of the land he claimed. Although
the subdivision was new and the lots irregular and contoured, such facts do not lessen the duty to discover actual possession. Nor does the fact the lots were purchased
through a real estate agency or that Dahl did not concern
himself with the precise boundaries of the lot he was purchasing make the doctrine inapplicable. Apparently the
Dahls made no inquiry as to the exact lot line because
they were satisfied with this visual observation of what
appeared to be the boundaries. The possession of the
plaintiff of the triangular piece of land as an encroachment
did not impress itself on the mind of Dahl because Dahl
did not know or ascertain where the surveyed lot line of
lot 39 as plotted was. Dahl paced off the depth of the lot;
he noticed the lot line on the plot map did not correspond
with what appeared to be the physical lot line, but he made
no inquiry of the location of the boundaries of the lot on
134.
135.
136.

See 6 R. POWELL, supra note 94, at 285-86.
Id. at 287-88.
26 Wis. 2d 607, 133 N.W.2d 295 (1965).
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the surface of the earth.'3 7

Although the case is a close one, it is submitted that the trial court
was correct in consigning Bump to his damages against Haley.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court dismisses too readily the facts that
the subdivision was new and the physical contours of the land
irregular. In addition to the public records, these were facts reasonably relied on by Dahl in ascertaining the boundaries of his
purchase. Moreover, Bump was more negligent than Dahl; he had
actual knowledge of his oral contract with Haley, but failed for
two years to see that the public records were changed to conform
to that contract. Although owners of equitable rights in land
should be protected whenever possible, the integrity of public land
records is a far more critical and momentous concern than the
occasional Bump.
Bell v. Protheroe"8 involved the owner of a recorded deed
who was charged with notice by reason of the possession of a
tenant under the owner of a prior unrecorded deed. The court
held that the fact that such tenant was also the grantor's tenant
could not aid the holder of the recorded deed:
The testimony of the tenant in the instant case clearly discloses that if defendant [holder of recorded deed] had made
inquiry of him she would have been apprised of plaintiff's
claim of ownership. The defendant made no such inquiry
of the tenant, nor so far as the record shows, of any person. To excuse her failure to inquire she [contends] that a
purchaser is not put upon inquiry by the continued possession of a tenant who was in possession prior to the transfer
of title by an unrecorded instrument. This exception to the
general rule in some cases [has been criticized because]
it assumes that the prospective purchaser has notice of the
prior state of title. We think it subject to the further criticism that it would require a purchaser under an unrecorded
instrument to oust the tenant in possession and create a
new tenancy in order that his possession might be notice
to the world. 13 9
The criticisms of the rule that continued possession by a tenant
under a prior grantor affords no notice do not make sense in light
4
of the fact that there is a recording act in effect in Oklahoma.' 1
With respect to the first criticism, prospective purchasers are required to have notice of the prior state of record title or purchase at their peril. As to the second, it would seem that the
rule requires no more than that a purchaser under an unrecorded
instrument record the instrument. In its holding on the notice
by possession issue, Bell v. Protheroe epitomizes a primary defect
137. Id. at 614, 133 N.W.2d at 299.
138. 199 Okla. 562, 188 P.2d 868 (1948).
139. Id. at 565, 188 P.2d at 871-72.
140. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 16 (1953).
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not only in the inconsistent possession cases 1 4 but in the off-record
risk cases as a whole: ignorance or lack of understanding of the
salutary policies embodied in the recording acts and over-emphasis
of "property rights" outside of those acts.
VIII.

TOLLED LIITATIONS PERIODS

Old claims seemingly barred by the statute of limitations but
in fact still extant because the limitations period has been tolled
due to infancy or insanity not apparent from the public records
present another threat to the interest of the bona fide purchaser.
Here, as with certain other off-record risks, the courts are engaged
in protecting the rights of minors and incompetents, although as
usual these underlying considerations are rarely articulated and
seldom balanced against the offsetting equities of bona fide purchasers. Indeed, few cases were found where the issue of the purchaser's bona fides is discussed or even referred to, although
there are several cases in which subsequent purchasers have been
defeated because of tolled limitations periods.
Z 42
is one case in which the bona fides of
Lawrence v. Boswell
subsequent purchasers were at least mentioned. It involved a limitations period tolled due to insanity. In holding for the heirs of
the incompetent as against a bona fide purchaser claiming under
a seven-year adverse possession statute the court said:
Defendant insists that where a party admits that another
has been in possession of land openly, notoriously, adversely, and bona fide against the world and under a claim
of right for a sufficient length of time in which a title by
prescription may ripen, this, as a matter of law, establishes good prescriptive title. As a general rule this contention is sound; but it was agreed to as a fact that Melvina Lawrence was adjudged insane in 1870, sent to the

asylum and remained there until the time of her death in
March, 1916. If Melvina Lawrence was continuously insane from 1870 until 1916, those years could not be counted
as a part of the term of prescription; and though the parties in possession had remained there more than twenty
years under open, notorious, adverse claim of title, their
possession did not ripen into a good prescriptive title. 41
Quare how the court can justify application of a rule presumably
designed to protect incompetents in favor of an incompetent's heirs
in light of the facts of this case.
What the cases represent in this area, as in that of off-record
family rights, is a rule incorporating the social policy of an earlier,
141. See Jones v. Sharp, 183 Okla. 22, 79 P.2d 585 (1938) (continued
possession by tenant under bona fide purchaser's grantor); cf. Wise v.
Latimer, 200 Okla. 526, 198 P.2d 1001 (1948).
142. 155 Ga. 690, 118 S.E. 45 (1923).
143. Id. at 693, 118 S.E. at 47.
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more leisurely agrarian culture. The rule has for the most part
outlived its usefulness, but some courts continue to adhere strictly
to it, thereby obstructing the free transferability of land and progress toward optimum land use in a rapidly changing society. It
is suggested that if it is still thought necessary to protect the ancient claims of incompetents and minors 144 by means of tolled
limitations periods, then provision should be made for placing the
status of the holders of these claims on the title records through
guardians, relatives or, since minors and incompetents often come
under their jurisdiction, through the courts.
IX.

PRIOR HOLDER IN CHAIN OF TITLE SENIOR IN RECORD BUT JUNIOR
IN TIME OF ACTUAL NOTICE

A former owner in a bona fide purchaser's chain of title,
claiming under an instrument executed after a prior instrument
from the same grantor to a different grantee, may have recorded
his instrument first, but had actual notice of the instrument first
executed. If the actual notice is not reflected in the records, then
in a state with a "notice" or "race-notice" recording act, such circumstances may operate as an off-record risk to defeat the interest of a subsequent bona fide purchaser.
Woods v. Garnett14 5 involved such a situation in a notice state.
The Mississippi Supreme Court held for Woods, a subsequent purchaser under the deed senior in time but junior in record, as
against Garnett, the holder under the deed junior in time but
senior in record whose owner had actual notice. The court rationalized the decision as follows:
But for the registry law, where one has conveyed his legal title, he has nothing left to convey to another, and that
other, with or without notice of the prior conveyance,
would get nothing, for his grantor had nothing to convey.
Now, the statute comes, and provides that, though a conveyance of the class named in the statute may be made, it
shall, as to certain persons, viz. creditors and purchasers
without notice, be valid only from a certain time, viz. the
time when it is filed for record. In other words, the operation of the unrecorded conveyance is suspended until
it shall be recorded, as against creditors and purchasers
without notice, and, when recorded, it does not operate
by relation as against such persons from the day of its
execution, but is effective only from and of the date of its
delivery for record. But when filed for record it has full
144. For cases in which subsequent purchasers' rights were held defeasible due, in part at least, to limitations periods tolled by infancy, see
Coulter v. Anthony, 228 Ark. 192, 308 S.W.2d 445 (1957); Grogan v.
Weatherby, 196 Ark. 705, 119 S.W.2d 552 (1938); Hart v. Wimberly, 173
Ark. 1083, 296 S.W. 39 (1927); cf. Breitman v. Jachnal, 99 N.J. Eq. 243, 132
A. 291 (1926), aff'd, 100 N.J. Eq.559, 135 A. 915 (1927).
145. 72 Miss. 78, 16 So. 390 (1894).
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scope and effect against the world. One who buys after
that event can find no protection in the statute, for its
terms have been complied with by the holder of the adverse title. It is no answer to say that it is inconvenient
to the purchaser to examine a long and voluminous record, made after the record of the title of his grantor. To
this the sufficient reply is that, but for the registry acts,
he would not have even the protection which such records
afford, but would deal at his peril with his grantor, and
secure only such title as he might assert. If that grantor
had good title because a purchaser for value without notice, that is a defense to his vendee; but if such grantor
was not such purchaser, then the validity of the title he
conveys must depend upon the character of his vendee, and
if such vendee is not a bona fide purchaser under the
common law or the statute, we cannot perceive from what
source a principle can be deduced which will afford him
protection. It seems clear to us that one who buys an estate cannot invoke the protection of the registry acts 146
as
against a deed under such act at the time of his purchase.
It is pointed out in Professor Philbrick's article on this subject
that the reasoning offered for the result in Woods requires a title
search not recognized by lawyers and abstractors as requisite:
"It is judicial theory, remote from practice."'1 47 In other words,
in a names index system a purchaser in the position of Garnett
would have to go outside his chain and search the grantor index for
the name of every grantor in his chain from the time such grantor
acquired title down to the present to see if such grantor had
made a prior conveyance recorded after the instrument in his (the
purchaser's) chain. Even then, such purchaser would have no
way of knowing whether or not the prior holder in his chain had
actual notice of the prior conveyance. Of course, the chain of title
aspect of the problem would be resolved in a tract index system
and it is submitted that the superiority of such indexes over
names indexes as manifested in this and other ways compels their
adoption in all jurisdictions. The initial cost of converting all
past records to a tract index system Would be more than offset by
the long term benefits and might well be defrayed by a special tax
on the beneficiaries of such a conversion, the real property owners.
148
Given the situation as it existed in Woods and similar cases,
however, the result reached is still unsatisfactory. In the first
place, such cases utilize the dubious approach, criticized previously
146.

Id. at 82, 16 So. at 397.

:147. Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and Notice, 93 U. PA L. REv.
391, 414 (1945).
148. Delay v. Truitt, 182 S.W. 732 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd, 103 Tex. 144,
124 S.W. 616 (1910) ("notice" state); Clark v. Sawyer, 49 Cal. 133 (1874)
("race-notice" state); Mahoney v. Middleton, 41 Cal. 41 (1871) ("racenotice" state); Goelet v. McManus, 1 Hun 306 (N.Y. 1874) ("race-notice"
state). See also cases discussed in Philbrick, supra note 147, at 414.
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in the forgery section, of assessing a subsequent purchaser's bona
fides by the merits of his predecessor in title. Secondly, the purchaser in the position of Woods does in a sense have notice of
the subsequent conveyance to Garnett's predecessor precisely because it is first recorded; that is, by running down the grantor
index for the period that title as reflected by the records, rather
than the date of the instruments, was vested in each preceding
holder, Woods could have learned of the second conveyance first
recorded. The purchaser in Garnett's shoes could not have been
put on notice by such means. Even if he found a defective instrument, as in the Woods case, he would be entitled to rely on
settled legal doctrines declaring its invalidity as to him. Finally,
the existence of a recording act invites reliance thereon to the extent of a reasonable title search. Although it is hard for a bona
fide purchaser such as Woods to lose his interest, it is in the public
interest that instruments conveying title to land be recorded as
quickly after execution as possible. A rule in the Woods v. Garnett situation favoring Garnett rather than Woods would promote
that public interest.
X.

RIGHTS OF PRIOR TRANSFEREES UNDER RECORDING ACTS WITH
GRACE PERIODS FOR FILING

The soundness of a public policy requiring immediate recording of a conveyance is attested to by the evolution of the recording acts in three states where cases were found in which grace
periods for filing of instruments for record provided by former recording acts operated as off-record risks. In those three states,
Alabama, Mississippi and Virginia, the recording acts now provide
no grace period for filing, and deeds and other conveyances are
void as against subsequent purchasers until recorded. 149 The
threat of this off-record risk in other jurisdictions, however, has
not been eliminated. Delaware, for instance, has a recording act
with a fifteen day grace period for filing. 150 Moreover, even in
those states in which the recording act has been changed, the risk
may still exist in the absence of a curative act or statute of limitations bar with respect to those conveyances made under the old
recording act with the grace period.
Betz v. Mullin 5 ' offered the most explicit rationale for the
defeasance of a bona fide purchaser's interest by a prior conveyance which was recorded after his own but still within the statutory period for filing. The reasoning bears a resemblance to that
offered by the court in the Woods case 152 discussed above:
149.
(1956);
150.
26 Del.
151.
152.

ALA. CODE tit. 47, § 120 (1958); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 867, 868
VA. CODE ANN. tit. 55, § 96 (1954).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 153 (1953). See Littletown v. Johnson,
97, 81 A. 47 (1911).
62 Ala. 365 (1878).
Woods v. Garnett, 72 Miss. 78, 16 So. 390 (1894).
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It is only by operation of the statute of registration
that a junior conveyance can have priority over a senior
conveyance of the legal estate. If the senior conveyance is
recorded within three months after its date, the statute
preserves its priority over a junior conveyance that may
be earlier recorded, though the junior grantee may not
have notice of it, and it is supported by a valuable consideration. 1 3
Statutes with grace periods for filing were perhaps a necessary step in the evolution of recording acts in the days when means
of transportation were slower and farmers hitched up their teams
to ride into the county seat to transact business only once every
few months or so. Today such statutes and cases like Betz' 5 4 are
inexcusable. The idea inherent in the reasoning of Betz and in
recording acts with grace periods, that the protection afforded by
record title is necessarily limited, is inappropriate in our present
complex and impersonal society in which one needs an accessible
and reliable reference upon which to base commercial transactions.
XI.

VOID JUDGMENTS AND COURT ORDERS

Judgments and court orders upon which a bona fide purchaser's title is based may be void for lack of service on a necessary
party or for want of jurisdiction for other reasons. Under such
circumstances, the bona fide purchaser's interest may be defeated
by the interest of the party adversely affected by the void judgment or those claiming under him.
These cases are similar to the lack of delivery and mental incapacity cases in that they often confront the bona fide purchaser with an individual who has been divested of his interest
solely through the misfeasance of others. Here also the wronged
party should normally recover the property at the expense of the
bona fide purchaser, who should be relegated to whatever protection he has through title insurance. These situations inhere in
the fallibility of men and, presumably, reasonable men recognizing
their unavoidability protect themselves through insurance.
On the other hand, in some of these cases the wronged prior
owner could have protected himself by the exercise of due care.
For instance, in Scott v. McNeal15" the bona fide purchasers were
defeated by an absentee, Scott, who returned after an absence of
seven years to find that his estate had been probated and sold.
The Supreme Court concerned itself mainly with the due process
issue, saying with respect to the effect of the probate proceedings
on the rights of the absentee:
153. 62 Ala. at 369 (1894).
154. See Clairborne v. Holmes, 51 Miss. 146 (1875); Camp Mfg. Co. v.
Carpenter, 112 Va. 79, '70 S.E. 497 (1911) (subsequent grantee held to have
notice even if prior instrument were not recorded).
155. 154 U.S. 34 (1894).
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The appointment by the probate court of an administrator of the estate of a living person, without notice to
him, being without jurisdiction, and wholly void as against
him, all acts of the administrator, whether approved by
that court or not, are equally void; ... and a conveyance
of property by the administrator passes no title.
The fact that a person has been absent and not heard
from for seven years may create such a presumption of his
death as, if not overcome by other proof, is such prima facie
evidence of his death that the probate court may assume him to be dead and appoint an administrator of his
estate....

But proof, under proper pleadings, even in a

collateral suit, that he was alive at the time of the appointment of the administrator, controls and overthrows
the prima facie evidence of his death, and establishes that
the court had no jurisdiction, and the administrator no authority; and he is not bound ....156
The Court's reasoning is made less compelling by the fact that in
a subsequent case it upheld the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania
statute permitting the administration of absentees' estates. 157 Such
statutes 5 8 offer a direct solution to the Scott v. McNeal problem,
but in their absence it is submitted that due process operates not
only in favor of the absentee who abandoned the property but also
in favor of the bona fide purchaser who acquired rights in the
subject property by exchanging value therefor. 159 In this area as
in others, however, the courts have been content to rest their
decisions on syllogisms such as "what is initially void is ever void
and life may not be breathed into it by lapse of time,"'16 0 without
probing too far into facts and equities.'
XII.

SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED WILL

When a link in the bona fide purchaser's chain of title is an
acquisition through inheritance, the subsequent discovery and probate of a will may divest a bona fide purchaser of his interests.
The reasoning here is based on the ancient doctrine that title to
realty passing under a will relates back to and takes effect as of
the time of the testator's death. Thus, in Reid's Administrator v.
Benge,' 62 in which a bona fide purchaser's mortgage was defeated
156. Id. at 49-50.
157. See Cunniss v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1905).
158. See Uniform Absence as Evidence of Death and Absentees' Property Act, 9 UNIF. LAWS ANN. §§ 5-12 (1957).
159. See also Grogan v. Weatherby, 196 Ark. 705, 119 S.W.2d 552 (1938).
160. Los Angeles v. Morgan, 105 Cal. App. 2d 726, 731, 234 P.2d 319,
322 (1951).
161. For other cases in which subsequent purchasers were defeated
because of void court judgments, see Wallace v. Nichols Adm'r, 56 Ala. 321
(1876); Hart v. Wimberly, 173 Ark. 1083, 269 S.W. 39 (1927) (probate
court made unauthorized sale of minor's homestead); Whitehead v. Garrett, 199 Okla. 278, 185 P.2d 686 (1947) (void tax sale).
162.

112 Ky. 810, 66 S.W. 997 (1902).
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by claimants under a subsequently probated will, the court
said:
By [statutes] in force at the death of T. T. Reid it is provided that the will speaks as of the testator's death, unless
a contrary intent appear by the will ....
It was held
as far back as 1827 ...
that the interest of a devisee

vested the instant of testator's death and was not lost by
destruction of the will before probate. .

.

. Applying that

rule here, it is clear that at the death of T. T. Reid, in 1888,
the appellants, devisees under his
163 will, had a vested estate
in his lands as the will provided.
Again, a strict application of an ancient common law rule defeats
the rights of a bona fide purchaser, for the doctrine of relation
back with respect to real property passing under a will undoubtedly
grew out of the feudal rule that there could be no abeyance of
seizin.164 This was perhaps a useful doctrine in the Middle Ages
with its more literal-minded approach to the law and when property passed down through generations of the same family, but is a
poor excuse today for enforcing the claims of those who gratuitously receive property under a will as against bona fide purchasers.
If devisees for whatever reason fail to have a will probated within
a reasonably short time after the testator's death, then they
should not prevail against claims innocently acquired for value
during the period of their delay, whether or not that delay was
excusable.
Significantly, one state, North Carolina, where two cases 65
similar to Reid's Administrator were found, has changed the result
therein by a statute providing that wills probated after two years
from the death of the testator shall not affect the rights of innocent purchasers for value. 166 It is submitted that if the courts of a
given jurisdiction fail, as some of them have with respect to this
off-record risk, 67 to adapt to modern circumstances, legislative
action similar to that taken in North Carolina is required.168

163. Id. at 814, 66 S.W. at 998. This statute is still in force.

Ky.

REV. STAr. §§ 330, 394 (1963).
164. See CRIBBET, PRNCIPLES or THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 63 (1952).

165. Barnhardt v. Morrison, 178 N.C. 563, 101 S.E. 218 (1919); Cooley
v. Lee, 170 N.C. 18, 86 S.E. 720 (1915).
166. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-39 (1966).
167. Most courts, however, have protected the bona fide purchaser
against those claiming under the subsequently discovered will. See, e.g.,
Eckland v. Jankowski, 407 l. 263, 95 N.E.2d 342 (1950).
168. Another case where a bona fide purchaser was defeated because
of a subsequently discovered will, in a state where the result apparently
has not been changed judicially or by legislation, is Cole v. Shetton, 169
Ark. 695, 276 S.W. 993 (1925).
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FORECLOSURE SALE STAYED UNDER SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS'

CIVIL RELIEF ACT

The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act' 69 provides that in
actions in any court when there is a default of appearance by any
party, the plaintiff shall file an affidavit to the effect that the
defendant is not in the military service. If the defendant is in
the military service, or that fact cannot be determined, provision
is made for protection of the serviceman's rights by appointment
of an attorney for him or filing of a bond by plaintiff. The court
may also grant other relief to protect the serviceman, including the
staying of a mortgage foreclosure action.
In the latter case, however, the mortgagor who took the
mortgage as a bona fide purchaser may have been unaware that a
servicemean had an interest in the mortgaged property because
such interest was not of record; that is, it was an unrecorded
equitable interest or an interest held of record by a corporation
in which the serviceman owned all the stock. In that situation,
rights acquired by a bona fide purchaser who took the mortgage
in the subject property may be impaired to the extent that his
mortgage foreclosure action is stayed under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act. In the one known case in which the serviceman whose interest was not of record brought an action under
the Act to void a foreclosure sale and subsequent deeds, however,
170
the court held for the bona fide purchasers under the sale.
The policies of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act were
7
indicated and fairly implemented in Application of Pickardl ' where
the court said:
[T]he act is to be construed liberally to accomplish its purposes .

.

. and the court holds that the benefits of the act

should be applied at least where the veteran is and has
It is

been the holder of the entire corporate stock ....

sufficiently made out in these papers that the ability of the
veteran to meet the obligation has been materially affected
by his military service. The question remains as to the
nature and extent of the relief granted, under all the circumstances, with due justice to the mortgagee. .

.

.

Un-

der all the circumstances it would seem just if the application be granted to the extent of staying enforcement of
the principal obligation of the mortgage until May 1, 1946
169. 50 U.S.C. § 520 (Appendix 1964).
170. Godwin v. Gerling, 362 Mo. 19, 239 S.W.2d 352 (1951). But see
Morse v. Stober, 233 Mass. 223, 123 N.E. 780 (1919), where it was held in
a suit for specific performance of a real estate sales contract, in which the
plaintiffs acquired their interest in the premises under a mortgage foreclosure sale which did not comply with the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act, that plaintiffs could not prevail unless they proved that no
serviceman owned an interest in the subject property at the time of the
sale.

171.

187 Misc. 400, 60 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
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under proper terms relating to amortization, etc., out 1of
72
surplus income and the maintenance of other payments.
The special facts of Pickard (that the serviceman was sole
shareholder in a corporation which had recorded its interest) made
it a proper case in which to protect the serviceman's rights at
the expense of the bona fide purchaser. A stay may also be
17
appropriate in a case like Twitchell v. Home Owner's Loan Corp.,

3

in which the serviceman's rights in the subject property were
based on an oral contract partly fulfilled by him. In such cases
the limited nature of a stay granted at the expense of bona fide
purchasers and the equitable policy of protecting the rights of
those whose ability to meet their financial obligations is impaired
by service to the country argue persuasively for such relief. It
is doubtful, however, whether the policy of protecting servicemen
with unrecorded interests from mortgage foreclosures is correct
as a general rule. To be required to record one's interest is a
small burden, and a serviceman like any other citizen should not
be immune to the consequences of a deceptive situation he creates. Certainly the statement in Hoffman v. Charlestown Five
Cents Savings Bank, 74 that "there is nothing in the [Act] which
limits its provisions to owners of record or to cases where the
mortgagee in fact knew or had reason to know who the owner of
the property was,'

7 5

disregards the fact that Congress enacted the

Civil Relief Act for a society in which recording acts play an
integral part in ordering and determining the ownership of land.
XIV.

INSTRUMENT GIVEN AS SECURITY FOR USURIOUS LoAN

When an instrument has been given as security for a loan
bearing a usurious rate of interest, the usury may be held to "infect" the entire transaction so as to void the mortgage or deed of
trust and render it ineffectual to pass title. Thus, a bona fide
purchaser claiming under the voided instrument is deprived of his
property interest even though the evidence of usury is off-record.
In Lankford v. Holton,176 for example, the Georgia Supreme Court
in discussing a former usury law applicable to the security deed
in question said: "Under the former law, the grantee in a security
deed tainted with usury could not, as against the grantor, convey
a good title, even to one who took bona
fide for value, before
'' 77
maturity, and without notice of the usury.
As indicated, Georgia had amended its usury law, T8 so that for
transactions after 1916 the only penalty is forfeiture of the inter172. Id. at 401, 60 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08.
173. 59 Ariz. 22, 122 P.2d 210 (1942).
174. 231 Mass. 324, 121 N.E. 15 (1918).
175. Id. at 328, 121 N.E. at 16.
176. 187 Ga. 94, 200 S.E. 243 (1938).
177. Id. at 99, 200 S.E. at 248.
178.

GA. CODE ANN. § 57-112 (1962).
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est on the loan. 179 In other states, such as Illinois, although the
defense of usury is good against a bona fide purchaser it has always affected the accounting only and not the validity of the
security instrument involved. 8 0 Presumably this is the case now
in Georgia. Nonetheless, the possibility that usury exists as an offrecord risk which would totally invalidate a link in a bona fide
purchaser's claim has not been eliminated in other jurisdictions.18 1
Moreover, even in states like Georgia the risk exists, in the absence of a curative act or statute of limitations bar, with respect
to transactions occurring before the effective date of the statute
alleviating the usury penalties.
On the other hand, if such an off-record risk were to manifest itself today it would be an anachronism. The risk evolved
as the result of a policy designed to prevent socially undesirable
conduct, and it no doubt received an added impetus from the
early fanatical distaste for usurers. As with the risk of forgery,
however, which has in part a similar origin, the effect of such a
policy on bona fide purchasers was not appropriate to its purpose.
The criminal law is a better instrument by which to control devi82
ant behavior. As was said in Marks v. Pope,1
the threat of
usury should not be "a paralyzing restraint upon the modern
financing of large hotels, apartments and other properties," ' 3 nor,
it is submitted, on the financing of single unit dwellings in a mobile
society. As Marks held, even an entirely pecuniary forfeiture assessed against a bona fide purchaser is subject to this objection.
XV.

RECORDING ERRORS

Another off-record risk arises when those charged with the
duty of recording instruments fail to do so properly. Thus, a
mortgage may be released on a different parcel than that on which
it was a lien, or the register of deeds may not promptly record an
instrument filed with him. In such cases, subsequent innocent
purchasers who acquire rights in the subject property are charged
with notice of the improperly recorded instrument even though an
examination of the records would not disclose it, and their rights
are subject to defeasance by those claiming under that instru179. For other pre-1916 Georgia cases in which bona fide purchasers
were defeated because of usury laws, see Wacasie v. Radford, 142 Ga. 113,
82 S.E. 442 (1914); Beach v. Lattner, 101 Ga. 357, 28 S.E. 110 (1897); cf.
Pottle v. Lowe, 99 Ga. 576, 27 S.E. 145 (1896).
180. See Hush v. Arnold, 318 Ill. 28, 148 N.E. 882 (1925); Olds v.
Cunnings, 311 Ill. 188 (1863). But see Marks v. Pope, 370 Ill. 597, 19
N.E.2d 616 (1939).
181. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 608, 609 (1964); Hare v.
General Contract Purchases Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952)
(the defense of bona fide purchaser is not available to the holder of a
usurious note).
182. 370 Ill. 597, 19 N.E.2d 616 (1939). See note 181 supra.
183.

Id. at 600, 19 N.E.2d at 620.
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ment. It is said that "the conveyance being operative as a record
from its delivery to the judge [register of deeds], no subsequent
mistake4 of his could deprive it of the operation thus given it by
18
law.
The remedies of a bona fide purchaser for this risk probably
should lie with the title insurance company. Like the mental incapacity and lack of delivery cases, the cases concerning recording
errors usually involve an innocent party, wronged by the misconduct of another, who is claiming against the bona fide purchaser.
As noted above, the bona fide purchaser in such cases is placed in
a position analogous to that of a receiver of stolen property, albeit
an innocent one,1' and
the maxim "first in time, first in right" is
5
properly applied.
Despite these considerations the courts rely even in this area
on conclusionary terms to justify their decisions. In Wilkins v.
88
Fehrenbach,
a case involving the mistaken release by the recorder of plaintiff's mortgage, the court said:
Assuming that the appellant had no notice that the release of plaintiff's deed of trust was improperly made, we
understand the question submitted to us for decision is
whether or not an attempted unauthorized release of a recorded deed of trust, attested by the recorder, by one not
the owner of the note therein described, is valid as between the holder of the note and a subsequent purchaser in
good faith and for value of the property described in the
deed of trust. Releases of deeds of trust and mortgages
by one not the holder of the note are void. .

.

. A release

made by one not the owner of the note described in the
mortgage or deed 87of trust securing it is void as to subsequent purchasers.'
Although the result in Wilkins v. Fehrenbach cannot be disputed in view of its facts and the absence of negligence on the
part of the plaintiff, the pernicious effects of such sweeping generalizations as those above when they are taken out of the factual
context of a case involving two equally innocent parties has already been seen in many of the forgery and fraud cases. In
addition, it is contended that even in a recording error case, despite
the fact that private citizens should not usually be charged with
overseeing that public officials properly perform their duties, a
situation may arise where the negligence of the victim of the
error is sufficient to warrant a decision for the bona fide purchaser.8 8
184. Mims v. Mims, 35 Ala. 23, 25-26 (1859).
185. See Hellweg v. Bush, 228 Mo. App. 876, 74 S.W.2d 89 (1934).
186. 180 S.W. 22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1915).
187. Id. at 24.
188. See Mims v. Mims, 35 Ala. 23 (1859); Carlisle & Co. v. King, 103
Tex. 620, 133 S.E. 241 (1910); Throckmorton v. Price, 28 Tex. 606 (1866).
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XVI.

ESTOPPEL BY DEED

Under the concept of estoppel by deed a grantor who conveys
title to property which he does not own and who later acquires
title to such property is estopped to disavow the prior conveyance. In some states this estoppel binds not only the grantor but
"privies in estate, privies in blood and privies in law."'18 9 Thus,
a bona fide purchaser to whom the grantor conveys after acquiring title will also be estopped to deny the effect of his grantor's
prior conveyance.
In addition to privity, a basic rationale for the decisions against
bona fide purchasers in these circumstances is that such purchaser has been placed on notice by the recordation of the conveyance to the prior grantee. This rationale is similar to that offered
above for the result in Woods v. Garnett.190 It also shares the
basic defect of the Woods reasoning in that it ignores the chain of
title concept relied on by lawyers and abstracters, requires a title
search not recognized by them as requisite, and is therefore another instance of judicial theory divorced from practice.
Thus, the court in Bernardy v. Colonial & U.S. Mortgage Co.""'
said in reversing a lower court decision for the bona fide purchaser:
[A] purchaser from one who has acquired the legal title
must examine the record, and ascertain whether or not he
has previously conveyed the property by a conveyance
purporting to convey the fee simple title, as a purchaser
is presumed to know the law, and to know that the party
in whom the legal title stands may have previously conveyed the property, and that such prior grantee may have
acquired such legal title by operation of law under the
statute.
Counsel for the respondent have discussed at some
length the question as to what extent a party has constructive notice of conveyances not in the line of his chain of
title, but in the view we take this question has no application to the case at bar, for, as before stated, both plaintiff
and defendant claim under the same party, Wilkes. No
question, therefore, is presented as to the notice of any
record of
conveyances lying outside of the plaintiff's chain
192
of title.
Although the court points out that South Dakota is a tract
index state, there would be no way for the subsequent bona. fide
purchaser examining the records to know if the. prior conveyance
of his grantor were valid even if he were to discover it in the records. Furthermore, the court's chain of title reasoning is patent
189. Tefft v. Munson, 57 N.Y. 97, 99 (1874).

190.
191.
192.

72 Miss. 78, 16 So. 390: (1894).
17 S.D. 637, 98 N.W. 166 (1904).
Id. at 638-39, 98 N.W. at 169.
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error because a chain of title excludes instruments recorded before acquisition or after a recorded relinquishment 193 and does not
necessarily encompass all conveyances from the same grantor.
Thus, a bona fide purchaser would be justified in considering the
prior conveyance invalid because not in his chain. The estoppel by
deed cases 9 4 are also inconsistent in that they hold the bona fide
purchaser to constructive notice of what the records supposedly reveal but do not hold the prior transferee to similar constructive
notice; that is, notice that the records showed that title was not
in his grantor at the time of the conveyance to him. Finally, the
notion of privity used to justify defeasance of the bona fide purchaser's interest in such cases presents another instance of adjudication by legal word-magic rather than a realistic appraisal of the
facts and the operation and purposes of the recording acts.
XVII.

DESTRUCTION OF

RECORDS

An off-record risk similar to that posed by recording errors
arises when records are destroyed, and the recording of an instrument prior to destruction without rerecording afterwards is
held to place a bona fide purchaser on constructive notice. If a
bona fide purchaser's grantor has executed a prior instrument
which has been destroyed and not rerecorded, the purchaser may
be defeated by those holding under the destroyed instrument.
Even if provision for rerecording is made, it may be held merely
permissive rather than mandatory. Thus, in Thomas v. Hanson'9 5
it was said:
The fact that the records of Toombs County may have
been burned does not destroy their effect as constructive
notice, and we cannot hold that . . . it was the intention

of the legislature to unseat or annul those records for the
purpose of constructive notice thereafter, though it was
the legislative intent to allow the recording or rerecording
in Stearns County of deeds made prior thereto. 19 6
Of course, the bona fide purchaser in Thomas should have been on
notice of the gap in the records that would have been revealed by
a title search. Moreover, the records presumably did not show
title in Hanson's grantor, Renville. Even if Hanson were aware
that the records had been destroyed, however, there was no way
he could learn of Thomas' claim because the land was unoccupied;
193. 6 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 289 (1965).
194. For other cases in which a bona fide purchaser was defeated because of estoppel by deed see Gray v. Delpho, 97 Misc. 37, 162 N.Y.S. 194
(Sup. Ct. 1916); Tefft v. Munson, 57 N.Y. 97 (1874) (prior deed of record
not entitled to recognition because forged); Simonson v. Monson, 22 S.D.
242, 1-17 N.W. 135 (1908). See also Ayer v. Philadelphia & Boston Face
Brick Co., 159 Mass. 84, 34 N.E. 177 (1893); Fries v. Clearview Gardens
Sixth Corp., 285 App. Div. 568, 139 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1955).
195. 59 Minn. 274, 61 N.W. 135 (1894).
196. Id. at 280, 61 N.W. at 136-37.
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and Renville, who supposedly retained his patent, possessed
prima facie evidence of title. Granted that some protection should
be afforded holders of record title for a short period after the
records are destroyed, the case is still disturbing because of its
restrictive construction of the statute providing for rerecording.
The pervasive defect of the off-record risk cases is found again in
this case and others like it: 1' 7 the failure to recognize the need for

clear land titles and to meet that need through proper implementation of recording acts.
Notably, statutes requiring rerecording of instruments after
destruction in order that they may continue to operate as constructive notice to subsequent purchasers have been upheld. 198 Similar provisions should be enacted whenever circumstances 'so require. Nevertheless, the cases involving destruction of records
arose in an era when documents were presumably kept in wooden
files. With the advent of steel filing cabinets, the threat of destruction has probably diminished.
XVIII.

CONVEYANCES VoID BECAUSE OF SECTION

70

OF THE

BANKRUPTCY ACT

Section 70 of the federal Bankruptcy Act' 9 9 provides that all
property of the bankrupt located in the United States which is not
exempt from execution passes to the bankruptcy trustee on the
date of filing of the bankruptcy petition. If the petition is filed in
a state other than that in which the property is located and a

bona fide purchaser subsequently buys such property from the
bankrupt, his interest will be defeated by the prior title of the
trustee. Although this particular risk is of record in the sense that
the bankruptcy petition has been filed with a federal district court,
when the court is in a state far removed from the situs of the land
involved the risk is for practical purposes off-record for the bona
fide purchaser.
One case was found in which an alleged bona fide purchaser
was defeated by this risk. In Hull v. Burr'0 0 the court said:
The defendants . . . filed separate pleas, seeking to set

up the defense of bona fide purchasers. Their rights were
all acquired subsequent to the adjudication in bankruptcy.

These pleas . . . failed . . . upon the ground that

the property they sought to purchase was in custodia legis.
The amendment to the Bankruptcy Act of 5 February,
1903, directing the trustee to file a certified copy of the
decree of adjudication in the office where conveyances of
197. See Fitch v. Boyer, 51 Tex. 349 (1879); cf. Stebbins v. Duncan,
108 U.S. 32 (1882).
198.

See Carlisle & Co. v. King, 103 Tex. 620, 626-27 (1910); cf. Ameri-

can Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1911).
199. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1964).
200. 61 Fla. 625, 55 So. 852 (1911).
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real estate are recorded, in every county where the bankrupt holds real estate not exempted from execution, etc.,
is directory only and does not affect the principle that the
bankrupt's title passes by operation of law to 201
the trustees
in bankruptcy as of the date of his adjudication.
As an alternative ground for its decision the court held that the
alleged bona fide purchasers had actual notice of the bankruptcy
proceedings.
Nevertheless, the operation of section 70 of the Bankruptcy
Act does present a substantial and unnecessary risk to bona fide
purchasers of real property. This is especially true because the
grantor's bankruptcy will normally preclude recovery of even the
purchase price by the bona fide purchaser. Of course, whether the
policy of orderly administration of debtors' estates is to take
precedence over the policy of secure record title to land is a question for the legislatures. Yet, section 21(g) of the Bankruptcy
20 2
Act

provides that in states authorizing such recording, the filing

of a petition in bankruptcy shall not be constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers unless first recorded in the land
record office for the county in which the land is located. Therefore, there is no reason for the Bankruptcy Act, in this respect at
least, 203 to operate in opposition to the recording acts. But
apparently only fourteen states have authorized such a recording. 20 4
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The off-record risks considered above may be divided into
three broad groups: (1) those which are necessary in some
cases to protect innocent parties, but which should be decided on a
case by case basis with due regard for the equities of the bona fide
purchaser; (2) those arising from social policies which are no
longer appropriate and should be subordinated to the policies embodied in the recording acts; and (3) those due to misinterpretation
of the recording acts and their objectives, or to imperfect recording acts, which should be eliminated entirely by the courts or legislatures. Of course, some or all of the above grounds may be in
part responsible for a given off-record risk, but in this final section
an attempt will be made to categorize off-record risks according to
the apparently predominant reason for their, existence.
The first group,, off-record risks necessary in some cases to
protect innocent parties, may be classified further into two subgroups based on the nature of the event which gives rise to the
need for protection. In the first subgroup are off-record risks aris201.
202.

203.

Id. at 629, 55 So. at 854.
11 U.S.C. § 44(g) (1964).

For other ways in which the Bankruptcy Act may operate as an
11 U.S.C. §§ 96,. 107

off-record risk see sections 60 and 67 of the Act.
(1964).
204. See 2 T. PATTON, TITLES 580 (2d ed. 1957).
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ing from human error. This category includes risks caused by
void judgments and court orders, recording errors, and destruction
of records. These off-record risks are almost inevitable in light
of man's imperfect state and usually, if the opposing party has not
contributed to their existence, warrant a decision against the bona
fide purchaser. The dangers they pose can sometimes be reduced, however, as in the case of destruction of records, where a
requirement for rerecording within a short time would go far
toward limiting that risk.
The second subgroup of off-record risks necessary to protect
innocent parties results from a desire to protect such parties from
the malfeasance of others or their own lack of understanding.
This category includes risk due to forgeries and frauds, mental
incapacity, and lack of delivery. It may also include incapacity
of an infant in certain cases, but the latter is more the result
of an outdated social policy. In any event, it is in this category
that the penchant of courts for deciding off-record risk cases
through the use of conclusionary terms and phrases is most apparent, because it is here that the need for close examination of
the facts and balancing of opposing equities is greatest. In light
of modern requirements for secure record title to land, it is submitted that in these cases a presumption should exist in favor of
the bona fide purchaser. Moreover, as has been seen, the "innocent" party has often contributed to his own loss, and therefore
does not deserve to be protected at the expense of a bona fide
purchaser.
The second group of off-record risk cases, those arising from
outdated social policies, are the result of incapacity of an infant,
lack of acknowledgment, unrecorded family rights, tolled limitations periods, or usury. Lack of acknowledgment is included here
because it is usually a vehicle for protection of homestead rights
and the rights of spouses. Off-record risks due to forgeries and
frauds might have been included in this group, but they are primarily a product of the desire to protect the innocent victim. The
off-record risks included here are mainly the products of a landbased society's efforts to provide security to minors, wives, incompetents and other dependents. Moreover, the rights which
these risks protect arose prior to the enactment of our present
recording acts, and therefore are not generally subject thereto.
But society is no longer agrarian in character. Real property is no
longer the principal form of wealth or the means by which security
for dependents can be best provided. It is, in relative terms, an
increasingly limited commodity the utility of which must be maximized from the standpoint of society as a whole rather than from
the point of view of a few women, children and lunatics. If it is
thought necessary to retain these ancient forms of social security,
they should be brought within the scope of the recording acts.
But with respect to the risk of usury, which had similar origins in
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the mores of an agrarian culture, there is no reason for its continued existence. Penalties for usury are inappropriate outside
the criminal law and should not be imposed except on the usurer
himself.
The third group, off-record risks arising from misinterpretation
of or defects in recording acts, is by far the largest. The risks
arising from misinterpretation of recording acts include legal incapacity, prior adverse possession, subsequently discovered wills,
holders of instruments senior in record but junior in date who
had actual notice of the prior conveyance, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, failure to inquire with respect to certain
types of possession, and estoppel by deed. The off-record risks
which exist because of defects in recording acts, usually failure to
provide for recordation, are undisclosed prescriptive and implied
easements, grace periods for filing, and section 70 of the Bankruptcy Act. In addition to being the most numerous, the risks in
this group are the most unnecessary. Often justified by ancient
or artificial doctrines and policies, they represent failures of the
courts and legislatures to recognize a modern need: the need
engendered by frequent transfers of real estate in a society in
which secure record title is a paramount necessity if housing
subdivisions, industrial parks, shopping plazas, and similar developments are to be constructed with maximum speed.
It has been said that
[i] deally, any system of record title should allow the purchaser of land to determine where the title is presently
vested and whether any person other than the owner is
capable of asserting a potential adverse claim of interest.
The system of title examination now employed in the
American states allows the purchaser to answer neither of
these queries conclusively, and, if it were not endowed
with the respectability accorded the20 status
quo, the system
5
might be a matter of some curiosity.

The failure of present recording systems to indicate definitively
where title to a given parcel of real estate is vested and whether
there are any potentially adverse claims is due in large part to
the existence of the off-record risks examined in this paper. Consequently, these off-record risks should be a primary object of reform for those who desire a closer approximation of the ideal in
the recordation of real property interests.

205. Payne, Increasing Land Marketability Through Uniform Title
Standards, 39 VA. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1953).
See also P. BAYSE, CLEARING
LAND TITLES 1 & n.1 (1953).
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX

A

Some risks for bona fide purchasers of real property result
from the fact that certain adverse claims appear in records which
are not accessible and therefore not examined in a normal title
search. Listed below are some of those risks and cases in which
subsequent purchasers were defeated by claims so recorded.
1. Lis pendens in some states operates as constructive notice
to purchasers of realty as of the time of filing of the petition,
without recordation anywhere other than in the court where the
action is pending. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 13, § 180 (1961). This seems
to have caused some difficulties. See, e.g., United States v. Dwyer,
250 F. Supp. 470 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); Simpson v. Bunis, 365 P.2d 134
(Sup. Ct. Okla. 1961); Hart v. Pharaoh, 359 P.2d 1074 (Sup. Ct.
Okla. 1961); Cannon Mills v. Spivey, 208 Tenn. 419, 346 S.W.2d 266
(1961); Wyatt v. Wycough, 232 Ark. 760, 341 S.W.2d 18 (1960);
Owens v. El Gato Inv. Co., 332 P.2d 22 (Sup. Ct. Okla. 1958); State v.
Keller, 264 P.2d 242 (Sup. Ct. Okla. 1953); Tesar v. Leu, 156 Neb.
528, 56 N.W.2d 803 (1953); Pearson v. Logan, 208 Okla. 234, 255
P.2d 255 (1951); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Continental Inv.
Corp., 202 Okla. 351, 213 P.2d 861 (1951); Whitehurst v. Abbot,
225 N.C. 1, 33 S.E.2d 129 (1945); People v. Chicago, 299 Ill. App. 504,
20 N.E.2d 306 (1939).
2. Eminent domain takings, through oversight or lack of statutory provision therefor, may not be of record other than in the
court which issued the decree authorizing the taking. Here again
subsequent purchasers have sometimes learned too late of records
of which they were on constructive notice. Norman Lumber Co. v.
United States, 223 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1955); Walsh's Inc. v. County
of Oswego, 9 App. Div. 2d 393, 194 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1959); State v.
Meeker, 75 Wyo. 210, 294 P.2d 603 (1956); see United States v. Ivie,
163 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ga. 1957).
3. Statutory liens sometimes present a risk for purchasers who
are not aware of their existence. See, e.g., Mason v. Cook, 187 Ky.
260, 218 S.W. 740 (1919).
4. Divorce decrees often affect title to real estate although
they may not be found elsewhere than in the court records. Subsequent purchasers' interests have been defeated by claims arising
from such decrees in the following cases: First Federal Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Fisher, 60 So.2d 496 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1952); Parduhn v.
Rodman, 201 Okla. 242, 204 P.2d 869 (1949).
5. Changes in county boundaries may result in claims being
recorded in a county other than the one in which real estate is
presently located. Nevertheless, subsequent purchasers have been
held to be on constructive notice of such claims. See Korper v.
St. Paul & N. P. Ry., 40 Minn. 132, 41 N.W. 656 (1889).
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.

Title defects not appearing of record but insured against
by a policy of title insurance to the extent not otherwise indicated
by the policy:
1. False personation of the true owner of the land or of his
consort.
2. Forged deeds, releases of mortgages and other instruments.
3. Instruments executed under fabricated or expired powers of
attorney. (Death or insanity of principal).
4. Deeds apparently valid but actually delivered after death of
grantor or grantee, or without consent of grantor.
5. Deeds to or from corporations before incorporation or after
surrender or forfeiture of charter.
6. Undisclosed heirs.
7. Misinterpretation of wills, deeds and other instruments.
8. Deeds by persons of unsound mind.
9. Deeds by minors.
10. Deeds by aliens.
11. Deeds by persons apparently single but actually married.
12. Birth or adoption of children after date of will.
13. Children living at date of will but not mentioned therein.
14. Mistakes in recording legal documents. (Incorrect indexing,
errors and omissions in transcribing and failure to spread of
record or preserve original instruments).
15. Want of jurisdiction of persons in judicial proceedings.
16. Discovery of will of apparent intestate.
17. Discovery of later will after probate of first will.
18. Federal estate and gift tax liens.
19. State inheritance and gift tax liens.
20. Capacity of foreign personal representatives and trustees to
act.
21. Failure to include necessary parties in judicial proceedings.
22. Claims of creditors against property conveyed by heirs or devisees within prescribed period after owner's death.
23. Deeds absolute on their faces but which are held to be equitable mortgages.
24. Deeds in lieu of foreclosure set aside as being given under
duress.
25. Ultra vires deed given under falsified corporate resolution.
26. Outstanding prescriptive rights not of record and not disclosed
by survey.
27. Conveyances and proceedings affecting rights of servicemen
protected by Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act.
28. Deed of property recited to be separate property of grantor
which is in fact community property.
29. Errors in tax records. (For example, listing payment against
wrong property.)
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30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
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Deed from bigamous couple-prior existing marriage in another jurisdiction.
Deed from convicted felon.
Conveyance by heir, devisee or survivor of a joint estate who
murdered the decedent.
Defective acknowledgment due to lack of authority of notary
(acknowledgment taken before commission or after expiration
of commission).
Federal condemnation without filing of notice. (Federal law
does not require filing of notice of taking in local recording
office.)
Rights under financing statements filed under Uniform Commercial Code in the name of the debtor who may not be the
owner of the property.
Record easement, but erroneous ancient location of pipe or
sewer line which does not follow route of granted easement.
Demolition liens where city demolishes building under statutory authority which are not recorded or are not recorded
against the true owner.
Descriptions apparently but not actually adequate.
Fraudulent changes in existing records by persons other than
recording officials. Changes in record by recording official
without authority upon oral request or upon being presented
with instrument changed after execution and recordation.
Ineffective waiver of tax liens by tax or other governing authorities repudiated later by successors.
Corporation franchise taxes as lien on all corporate assets, notice of which does not have to be recorded in the local recording office.
Wills revoked by marriage after execution when marriage
not contemplated by terms of will.
Special assessments where they become liens upon passage of
resolution and before recordation or commencement of improvements for which assessed.
Interests arising by deeds to fictitious characters to conceal
illegal activities on the premises.
Erroneous reports furnished by tax officials, but not binding on municipality.
Administration of estates and probate of wills of persons absent but not deceased.
Undisclosed divorce of spouse who conveys as sole heir of deceased consort.
Marital rights of spouse, purportedly but not legally divorced.
Tax homestead exemptions set aside as fraudulently claimed.
Break in chain of title beyond period of examination of public records where running of adverse possession statute has
been suspended. (True owner is incompetent, absent or incarcerated or title is held by the sovereign.)

90
51.
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Deed from trustees of purported business trust which is in fact
a partnership or joint stock association.
52. Deed of executor under non-intervention will when order of
solvency has been fraudulently procured or entered.
53. Deed from record owner of land where he has sold property to
another purchaser on unrecorded land contract and the purchaser has taken possession of premises.
54. Void conveyances in violation of public policy: (Payment of
gambling debt, payment for contract to commit crime or conveyance made in restraint of trade).
55. Duress in execution of instruments.
Letter from Martin C. Bowling, Jr., Associate Counsel for Lawyers
Title Insurance Corporation, to Ralph L. Straw, Jr., April 7, 1967.
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